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Art DeAccessions AnD the Limits of fiDuciAry Duty
Sue Chen*
AbStrACt
Art deaccessions prompt lawsuits against museums, and some 
commentators advocate using the stricter trust standard of care, 
instead of the prevailing corporate standard (business judgment 
rule), to evaluate the conduct of non-profit museum boards. This 
Article explores the consequences of adopting the trust standard 
by applying it to previously unavailable deaccession policies of 
prominent art museums. It finds that so long as museum boards 
adhere to these policies, their decisions would satisfy the trust 
standard. This outcome illustrates an important limitation of 
fiduciary law: the trust standard evaluates procedural care but 
cannot assess deaccessions on their merits. Yet this limitation, 
far from undercutting the trust rule, balances judicial review with 
protecting boards’ management discretion. This article ventures 
beyond formalist analysis of fiduciary duty and examines the non-
legal, substantive rules governing art deaccessions. It argues that 
complemented by non-legal rules, the trust standard provides the 
best framework for adjudicating deaccession lawsuits because it 
ensures judicial scrutiny of deaccession procedures while leaving 
appraisal of deaccessions’ merits to museum professionals and 
the public they serve.
I. IntroduCtIon
In September 1970, the Metropolitan Museum of Art learned that Velazquez’s 
portrait of Juan de Pareja was up for auction. The painting, one of Velazquez’s 
masterpieces, depicts the artist’s assistant and was first exhibited in the 
Pantheon in 1650. The Metropolitan bought the work for just over $5.5 
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million, then a record price for a single work of art.1 After the painting was 
exhibited, a New York Times editorial opined that despite the price tag, “the 
Metropolitan’s acquisition of this superb painting enhances the quality of its 
great collection and permanently enriches the life of the city.”2
All went well until 1972, when the N.Y. Times reported that to help finance the 
Velazquez purchase, the Metropolitan had been secretly selling works from the 
modern art collection bequeathed by Adelaide de Groot.3 The revelation led to 
fierce criticism of the Metropolitan and of its Director Thomas Hoving,4 plus 
a seven-month investigation by the state Attorney General that resulted in the 
museum agreeing to notify the Attorney General of any deaccessions worth 
more than $5,000. The Metropolitan’s debacle helped to bring the concept of 
deaccession to the public consciousness and since then, the responsibilities of 
museum boards in art deaccessions have been scrutinised and criticised.
Museum boards7 are sometimes sued for their role in deaccessions. Their 
cases highlight a problem bedevilling fiduciary law: against what standard 
should the decisions of non-profit corporate directors be measured? 9 Many 
1 Thomas Hoving, �The Chase, the Capture’, in       The Chase, the Capture: Collecting at the 
Metropolitan pp. 30-40 (Metro. Museum of Art ed., 1975) [hereinafter Hoving, �The Chase’]; 
see also Karl E. Meyer, �The Deaccession Controversy’, reprinted in Law, Ethics and the 
Visual Arts 1273, 1274 (John Henry Merryman et al. eds, 5th edn 2007). The exact price was 
$5,544,000. For the Museum’s auction stratagems and the thrill of bidding for the Velazquez, 
see Hoving, �The Chase’, above, at pp. 39-40. For a less flattering account of the Velazquez 
purchase, and of the Metropolitan in general, see John L. Hess, The Grand Acquisitors (1974).
2 Hoving, �The Chase’, above, note 1, at p. 40 (quoting          The New York Times).
3 See Meyer above, note 1, at p. 1274. In her will, de Groot requested that the Metropolitan                 
not sell works from her bequest, but the subsequent phrase “without limiting in any way the 
absolute nature of this bequest” made the request precatory and thus unenforceable. Thomas 
Hoving, Making the Mummies Dance p. 291 (1993) [hereinafter Hoving, Making the Mummies 
Dance]. For Hoving’s personal, irreverent account of the de Groot deaccession battle within the 
Metropolitan, see Hoving, Making the Mummies Dance pp. 275-306.
4 See, e.g., John Rewald, �Should Hoving be De-accessioned?’, reprinted in          A Deaccession 
Reader (Stephen E. Weil ed., 1997).
5 Hoving, Making the Mummies Dance, above, note 3, at p. 306; Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, 
above, note 1, at p. 1275. Louis Lefkowitz, then-attorney general of New York, eventually 
concluded that the Metropolitan’s actions did not constitute mismanagement, violation of de 
Groot’s gift, or any other wrongdoing; as Hoving describes it, “[t]he only criticism – and it was 
harsh – was that I had handled the public relations atrociously.” Hoving, Making the Mummies 
Dance, above, note 3, at p. 306.
 Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, above, note 1, at p. 1271.
7 Confusingly, museums that are non-profit corporations call their board members �trustees’. For            
clarity, in this Article, the term �board members’ denotes those serving on boards of museums, be 
they charitable trusts or non-profit corporations; �trustees’ and �directors’ will be used according 
to their legal definition; �Director’, as a title, refers to the museum’s chief executive officer.
 See, e.g.,  Dennis v. Buffalo Fine Arts Academy, 36 N.Y.S.2d 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); Rowan 
v. Pasadena Art Museum, No. C322171 (Cal. Super. Ct. 191) reprinted in Law, Ethics and the 
Visual Arts, above, note 1, at p. 122.
9 See Jennifer L. White,  �When It’s OK To Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary-Duty Framework 
for Analyzing the Deaccessioning of Art to Meet Museum Operating Expenses’, 94 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1041 (1996), reprinted in (1996) I Art Antiquity and Law 375.
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art museums are non-profit corporations and the trend is to apply the corporate 
standard, which includes the highly deferential business judgment rule. But 
because the non-profit corporation lacks many of the functional attributes that 
justify the business judgment rule, some commentators advocate using the 
trust standard to evaluate the decisions of non-profit corporate directors.10 
What has been left unexplored is how the trust standard applies to museums, 
as well as its implications. This Article applies the trust standard to the 
deaccession procedures of some prominent American art museums. It finds 
that so long as museums’ internal deaccession guidelines provide for particular 
procedures and boards adhere to those procedures, board decisions would 
survive challenges under the trust standard. This outcome illuminates the 
limits of the law in resolving management disputes such as art deaccessions: 
the trust standard is procedurally focused and asks whether trustees were 
sufficiently deliberative in making their decisions; it does not authorise review 
of the merits of the decision.
But far from proving failure, this limitation, by balancing judicial review 
with board discretion, makes the trust standard the ideal legal framework in 
resolving deaccession disputes. Moreover, law’s inability to reach the substance 
of a deaccession does not free museum boards to decide on whim rather than 
merits. Complementing the trust standard’s procedural safeguards are non-
legal rules that regulate deaccessions on the merits. These restraints range 
from professional guidelines, to self regulation, to the court of public opinion. 
Together, the trust standard and the non-legal restraints create a normatively 
desirable set of rules governing art deaccessions: the trust standard holds 
museum boards to a more rigorous procedural standard than that required by 
the corporate rule, while the substance of the ultimate decision is judged by 
the museum profession and the public it serves.
This Article argues that, complemented by non-legal rules, the trust standard 
is the best framework for adjudicating legal disputes over art deaccessions. 
Part II introduces the practice of deaccession and its function in American 
art museums’ approach to collection management. It then ventures beyond a 
formalist treatment of deaccessions by examining how the museum profession 
regulates deaccessions as well as the board’s role within the complex 
organisational structure of the art museum. Part III compares the fiduciary 
duties of the corporate director with those of the trustee and explores applicable 
standards for non-profit corporate directors. It further reviews arguments put 
forth for adopting a trust standard of care in the non-profit corporate context. 
Part IV applies the trust standard to current art museum practices and finds 
that if museums have certain procedures and follow them, their deaccessions 
10 See Patty Gerstenblith, �The Fiduciary Duties of Museum Trustees’,           Colum. J.L. & Arts 175 
(192); Denise Ping Lee, �The Business Judgment Rule: Should it Protect Nonprofit Directors?’, 
103 Colum. L. Rev. 925 (2003); White, above, note 9. 
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satisfy the trust standard. This part then discusses the trust standard’s focus 
on procedure and how it limits the trust standard’s scope. Part V examines 
how non-legal, substantive restraints on art deaccessions complement the 
trust standard’s procedural safeguards. Part VI shows that the trust standard 
strikes the best balance between holding museum boards accountable for ill-
considered deaccessions and giving boards sufficient management discretion. 
It explains that the trust standard, together with non-legal rules, ensures judicial 
scrutiny of deaccession procedures while leaving the merits of deaccessions 
to more knowledgeable critics: museum professionals and the public they 
serve. Part VII concludes.
II. the VIew from the GAllery: how muSeumS thInk About deACCeSSIonS
Deaccession is an integral part of collection management in American art 
museums. Whether to deaccession requires the board to make fundamentally 
artistic and financial decisions about the collections in their charge. Because 
deaccessions proceed within the peculiar context of the art museum, it is 
critical to understand how art museums operate. This section briefly reviews 
the origin of American art museums and their unique approach to collection 
management; explains why deaccession is critical to that management 
philosophy; describes the range of non-legal professional rules governing 
art deaccessions; and concludes with a discussion of the art museum’s 
organisational structure and the board’s role within.
A. A Brief overview of American Art museums
Deaccession is “the practice by which an art museum formally transfers its 
ownership of an object to another institution or individual by sale, exchange, 
or grant, or disposes of an object if its physical condition is so poor that 
it has no aesthetic or academic value.”11 Despite the handwringing that 
accompanies a museum’s sale of a favourite painting, museum professionals 
view deaccession as an accepted and, indeed, necessary practice in American 
museums.12
11 Ass’n of Art Museum Directors, �Art Museums and the Practice of Deaccessioning’ (Nov. 
2007), at 1, <http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/FINALPositionPaperDeaccessioning.
doc> [hereinafter AAMD, �Practice of Deaccessioning’]. Courts use a similar definition. See 
Dennis v. Buffalo Fine Arts Academy, 36 N.Y.S.2d 49, 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). Deaccession 
is different from disposal: whereas deaccession is the decision to transfer ownership, disposal 
refers to how that transfer is to take place – that is, should the work be sold or exchanged? Marie 
C. Malaro, �Deaccessioning: The American Perspective’, 10 Museum Mgm’t & Curatorship 
273, 273 (1991) [hereinafter Malaro, �Deaccessioning’]. Fiduciary obligations apply to both 
deaccession and disposal.
12 Marie C. Malaro, A Legal Primer on Managing Museum Collections p. 217 (199) [hereinafter 
Malaro, A Legal Primer]; see also White, above  note 9, at p. 1043 (“the museum community 
generally recognizes the propriety of selling artwork in order to purchase other – presumably 
superior or more appropriate – art for the collection.”); Stephen E. Weil, �Deaccessioning in 
American Museums: I’, reprinted in A Deaccession Reader, above, note 4, at p. 64 [hereinafter 
Weil, �Deaccessioning’].
Art Deaccessions and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty
107
Unlike their European counterparts, American art museums did not spring 
forth from the great royal and aristocratic collections.13 Rather, they owe their 
inception and continuing existence to private largesse: 
Almost without exception, our great museums are the result of 
individual citizens determining the need; defining the mission; 
financing the building . . . and assembling the collections through 
private purchase and gift.14 
But reliance on donors obliged American museums to maintain liberal 
acquisition policies, “either because the curator hoped for more and better 
quality in [the] future by being nice to the Joneses in their hour of need or he 
simply didn’t know how to say no. Paintings and decorative objects poured 
in, usually without a coherent plan,” so that by the early 1900s, many art 
galleries possessed clutter instead of collections.1 Liberal and indiscriminate 
acquisitions saddled museums with duplicates and second-rate works.1 
Eventually, museums realised “there must be some order and purpose in 
collecting . . . [which] cannot be achieved without a judicious weeding of 
existing holdings.”17 This in turn meant that museums that liberally or 
indiscriminately acquire artworks must also be able to deaccession them to 
preserve the coherence of their collections.
American art museums are also not depositories or archives; they are not, as the 
art-law scholar Marie Malaro writes, “mausoleums dedicated to preserving, 
intact, the accumulation of successive generations” 1 and whose mission is 
antithetical to the concept of deaccession.19 Instead, American museums were 
created to educate the public;20 a museum’s collection is not an end unto itself 
13 Peter Temin, �An Economic History of American Art Museums’, in          The Economics of Art 
Museums pp. 179, 11 (Martin S. Feldstein ed., 1991).
14 James N. Wood, �The Authorities of the American Museum’, in          Whose Muse? Art Museums and 
the Public Trust pp. 103, 107 (James Cuno ed., 2004). Even today, private donations account 
for over 90% of artworks held in public trust. Ass’n of Art Museum Directors, �Art Museums, 
Private Collectors, and the Public Benefit’ (Oct. 2001), at 1, <http://www.aamd.org/papers/
documents/PrivateCollectors.pdf>.
1 Dillon Ripley,  The Sacred Grove: Essays on Museums pp. 67-69 (1969); see also Malaro, 
A Legal Primer, above, note 12, at p. 217 (“Many museums grew unchecked in their early days 
. . . areas of interest were undefined, and almost anything offered was accepted.”).
1 Isabel Andrews, �To Sell – or Not to Sell?’,         Apollo, 1 Sept. 2007, available at <http://www.
apollo-magazine.com/issue/september-2007/121411/to-sell-or-not-to-sell.thtml>.
17 Malaro, A Legal Primer, above, note 12, at p. 217.
1 Id. at p. 216.
19 Weil, �Deaccessioning’, above, note 12, at p. 63.        
20 See Ripley, above, note 15, at p. 6 (noting that museums have been called the �people’s 
university’); Temin, above, note 13, at p. 11 (observing that American museums were 
founded “to educate the people’s taste, to help them identify with the values of the successful 
industrialists.”); see also Michael Conforti, �Deaccessioning in American Museums: II – Some 
Thoughts for England’, reprinted in A Deaccession Reader, above, note 4, at p. 79. In addition 
to education, museums may also be established for other purposes. For example, the Barnes 
Foundation’s stated mission is to “promote the advancement of education and the appreciation 
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but a means to serve its educational mission.21 Failure periodically to pare and 
reshape the collection could undermine a museum’s purpose because stasis 
may render the collection irrelevant. As Malaro asks: 
[h]ow can a museum present itself as an educational organization 
and yet relinquish a continuing responsibility to review critically 
its progress in achieving its particular goals?22 
Finally, the great majority of American art museums are private organisations. 
They are not arms of the State and are unencumbered by the burden of 
representing a national cultural patrimony.23 This leaves American art museums 
more autonomy in collection management than their European counterparts. 
In exercising that autonomy, American museums chose to be pragmatic about 
deaccessions, treating it as a procedural question rather than a philosophical 
inquiry into the relationship between collecting art and American culture.24 One 
museum Director observes that such pragmatism reflects the nation’s character: 
[America] is a country which has achieved its position in the 
world through a lack of historical consciousness and a readiness 
to deal creatively with the traditions it has inherited. One could 
argue it is appropriate that America’s public art collections reflect 
of the fine arts” The Barnes Foundation, Mission Statement, available at <http://www.
barnesfoundation.org/h_mission.html>. In addition, the museum was meant to preserve Albert 
Barnes’s collection as his will requires everything to be displayed as he left it. Patricia Horn, 
�Judge Backs Move by Barnes Gallery’, Phila. Inquirer, 14 Dec. 2004, at A01.
21 Weil, �Deaccessioning’, above, note 12, at p. 63. According to the Association of Art Museum               
Directors (AAMD), “[t]he mission of all art museums is to serve the public through art and 
education. Fulfillment of this mission is the primary goal of every AAMD member and the 
touchstone by which all decisions are made concerning museum program and operations.” 
AAMD, �Practice of Deaccessioning’, above, note 11.
22 Malaro, �Deaccessioning’, above, note 11, at p. 277.       
23 See Edward P. Alexander, Museums in Motion p. 24 (1979) (noting that after the French 
Revolution, the Louvre became for the State a symbol of “the new society created under the 
democratic ideals of liberty, equality, and brotherhood.”); Wood, above, note 14, at pp. 105-06 
(observing that the French Republic created public museums who saw their role as “a national 
heritage assembled and presented for the benefit of the public.”); Andrews, above, note 16 
(discussing political pressures on British museums, whose trustees are usually appointed by 
the government); see also Glenn D. Lowry, �A Deontological Approach to Art Museums and 
the Public Trust’ in Whose Muse? Art Museums and the Public Trust,  above, note 14, at p. 129 
(“American art museums are primarily private entities that are accorded public status, whereas 
European museums are, for the most part, civic and state institutions.”). Some American 
art museums, such as the North Carolina Museum of Art and the Smithsonian Institution, 
are government creations. The Smithsonian was created as a trust by an Act of Congress. 
�Smithsonian: History’, <http://www.si.edu/about/history.htm> (last visited 13 Mar. 2009). Of 
the seventeen serving on the Smithsonian’s Board of Regents, six are members of Congress, 
one is the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and another is the Vice President 
of the United States. �About Smithsonian: the Board of Regents’, available at <http://www.
si.edu/about/regents/> (last visited 13 Mar. 2009). Some private art museums in the United 
States have strict rules against changing the collection. See below note 65.
24 Conforti, above, note 20, at p. 0.      
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this cultural reality as works flow in and out of its museums from 
generation to generation.25
B. Why museums Deaccession
These characteristics of American art museums – indiscriminate acquisition, 
pedagogical mission, and pragmatism – permit and even mandate deaccessions. 
Collecting art “is not a mechanical process. It is a combination of intelligent 
selection and thoughtful pruning. Periodic reevaluation is as important as 
acquisition, and deaccessioning, if properly used, can be a means toward true 
growth.”26 Deaccession, therefore, cannot be analysed in isolation; it is an 
integral part of collection management and must be treated as such.27 In this 
context, deaccession involves artistic or financial decisions about how best to 
build, improve and manage an art collection. What follows is an examination 
of the three main reasons museums deaccession and the substantive 
decisions – both artistic and financial – embodied in each instance.2
Deaccessions may be driven by acquisition needs: museums sell some of their 
holdings to increase their acquisition funds or to pay for �better’ works.29 The 
de Groot deaccession to pay for Juan de Pareja is one such example.30 A 
deaccession decision compares the artistic and financial merits of maintaining 
25 Id.
26 Malaro, A Legal Primer, above, note 12, at p. 216. The professional guideline for museums 
provides that “[t]he development, preservation, conservation, documentation, study, presentation, 
and explication of the collection are cardinal responsibilities of a collecting museum.” Ass’n 
of Art Museum Directors, Professional Practices in Art Museums 5 (May 2001) [hereinafter 
AAMD Professional Practices]; see also AAMD, Practice of Deaccessioning, above, note 
11 (“Deaccessioning is practiced to refine and enhance the quality, use, and character of an 
institution’s holdings.”).
27 Stephen E. Weil, �Introduction’, in     A Deaccession Reader, above, note 4, at p. 4 [hereinafter 
Weil, �Introduction’].
2 This article focuses only on deaccessions of works to which museums have legal and              
unencumbered title. Thus, although bequest conditions and repatriating stolen art are significant 
topics within the deaccession literature, they command no analysis here. In the context of 
fiduciary obligations, bequests and repatriation problems are easier problems to resolve than 
the usual sale. This is because even the corporate standard obliges board members to comply 
with the relevant law. See Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding 
that the business judgment rule does not apply to knowing criminal violations). For example, 
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 35 U.S.C §§ 3001-3013 (1994), 
requires museums receiving federal funds to return Native American funerary objects upon 
request. Thus the real question in bequests and repatriation deaccessions is not the standard of 
fiduciary duty to be applied, but the laws governing estates and stolen art.
29 Conforti, above, note 20, at 77.     
30 Another is the Hirshhorn’s sale of some less important Man Ray works to pay for the artist’s                 
more significant mixed-media work, Seguidilla. Weil, �Deaccessioning’, above, note 12, 
at p. 67. And in 199, MOMA used $40 million from the deaccession of seven works from 
its permanent collection – works by de Chirico, Kandinsky, Mondrian, Monet, Renoir, and 
Picasso – to buy van Gogh’s Portrait of Joseph Roulin. Ralph E. Lerner & Judith Bresler, Art 
Law vol. 3, at pp. 13-4 (3rd edn 2005). The New York Times called the van Gogh “one of 
the most spectacular additions to the Museum of Modern Art in many years.” Evans Roth, 
�Deaccession Debate’, Museum News, Mar/Apr 1990, at p. 45 (quoting The New York Times).
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the status quo against trading one group of works for another. This is a financial 
decision because museums must choose the best funding option for an 
acquisition.31 Given the competitiveness of the art market and the formidable 
purchasing power of private collectors, museums must be prepared to pay 
significant sums in order to acquire works of art of a reasonable quality. Star 
acquisitions cost tens of millions of dollars: whereas the Metropolitan set a 
record with its $5.5 million Velazquez purchase in 1970, in 2004 the museum 
had to pay between $45 to $50 million – more than twice what it had ever 
paid for an acquisition – for Duccio’s Madonna and Child.32 Although other 
funding options exist in the form of acquisition funds and wealthy donors, 
these sources may attach restrictive conditions or may be better used to pay 
for other aspects of the collection. Even if museums choose to use these 
sources, they may not be enough to cover the entire purchase price. Thus the 
board must decide if funding options should include deaccessions.
Deaccession to pay for a superior work is also an artistic decision about what 
to collect. American museums, by and large, subscribe to the masterpiece 
theory of collecting, which emphasises the acquisition of masterpieces and 
superb representative examples over providing context with a multiplicity of 
works.33 When a masterpiece is added to the collection, lesser works become 
unnecessary and dispensable. As the Metropolitan’s Hoving explains:
to reach for some of these rare great works of art, we are weeding 
out and disposing of numbers of work that once seemed essential 
to our collection but now are either redundant, superfluous, or not 
of the requisite quality.34 
A specific deaccession also embodies this artistic decision. That is, setting 
aside the general preference for masterpieces, does this upgrade improve 
the collection? Is it better to sell some average to very good Impressionist 
canvases to gain one superb Velazquez? Museums must compare each work’s 
place within the collection: what does the Velazquez contribute artistically to 
31 The Director of the Kempner Art Museum describes the relationship between deaccession and             
finances: “If we want to fill important gaps in the collection, deaccessioning is necessary . . . 
We will sell only minor works of art that will bring in small amounts of money, but we can use 
it to help purchase more experimental modern works that are not in our collection . . . .” David 
Bonnetti, �You Call it Selling, Museums Call it “Housecleaning” ’, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
30 Sept. 2007, at F5.
32 Calvin Tomkins, �The Missing Madonna’,     New Yorker, 11 July 2005, at p. 42 [hereinafter 
Tomkins, �Madonna’]. 
33 Conforti, above, note 20, at p. 77. In contrast, the European approach favours collecting a               
multiplicity of works – the superstars and the less famous – by the same artist or from the same 
period. Id. at n.23.
34 Hoving, The Chase, above, note 1, at p. 10. But see Lee Rosenbaum, Op-Ed., �For Sale: 
Our Permanent Collection’, N.Y.Times, 2 Nov. 2005, available at <http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/11/02/opinion/02rosenbaum.html> (criticising art museums for outdoing one other 
by commissioning sleek building projects and “redecorate[ing] their shiny new edifices with 
some appropriately breathtaking acquisitions.”).
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the existing collection? What is lost by the sale of a lesser Monet or Degas? 
Does the transaction improve the overall quality? 3 These questions demand 
that board members use their knowledge of art and of the collection’s strengths 
and weaknesses when deciding.
A second reason museums deaccession is a change in collecting focus. A 
museum may deaccession a genre it no longer wishes to collect and add 
proceeds from the sale to the acquisition fund. Usually these decisions are 
driven by financial considerations. In 2006, the Albright-Knox Art Gallery’s 
board voted to deaccession over 200 works from its Asian and antiquities 
collection to increase its endowment and focus on acquiring modern and 
contemporary works.3 The combination of: 
funding cutbacks, a small philanthropic community and a heated 
up art market . . . increasingly pressed [the gallery] to keep pace 
with the acquisitions necessary to [its] vitality and growth . . . .37 
Financial pressures may thus lead a museum to conclude it is no longer feasible 
to collect across all periods and that its limited funds are better used to improve 
the quality of a collection with a narrower focus. The board then exercises 
artistic judgment in deciding which genres to deaccession and which to keep.
The third, and most controversial, reason museums deaccession is to fund their 
operations.3 This constitutes a financial decision about how to raise income 
for the prosaic costs of running a museum, such as conserving artworks and 
fixing the plumbing. Taking care of the collection is a resource-intensive 
enterprise. Conservation requires a team of specialists and storage space 
must be secure, use proper temperature and humidity control, and permit 
efficient access. 39 Storage, maintenance, and conservation of artworks alone 
can run into tens of millions of dollars and represent a significant percentage 
of the annual operating budget.40 Additionally, museums must cope with 
3 See id. at pp. 7-29 (discussing the Metropolitan’s acquisition philosophy); AAMD, Practice of 
Deaccessioning, above  note 11 (identifying the criteria for deaccessioning a work of art).
3 Richard Huntington, �Albright to Sell 200 Antiquities’,       Buffalo News, 10 Nov. 2006, 
at A1. Other museums have also deaccessioned entire genres. When the Walker Art 
Center in Minneapolis began to focus on contemporary art, it deaccessioned its original 
collection – including nineteenth-century American and European paintings, Chinese porcelain 
and Near Eastern jewellery. Roth, above, note 30, at p. 42. Sotheby’s auctioned 22 of the 
Walker’s American paintings; the sale brought in $10.5 million, which was channelled to the 
museum’s acquisition fund. Id.; Conforti, above, note 20, at p. 76. Both the Corcoran Gallery 
and the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts deaccessioned their European paintings to focus on 
their American collection. Conforti, above, note 20, at p. 76. And in 2003, the Aldrich Museum 
of Contemporary Art in Connecticut deaccessioned all its paintings and sculptures to focus on 
collecting photographic works. Lerner & Bresler, above, note 30, at p. 14.
37 Huntington, above, note 36.   
3 A related reason art museums may deaccession is because of space constraints or cost of care.               
39 Malaro, A Legal Primer above, note 12, at pp. 217-1.
40 In 2007, the Metropolitan Museum of Art spent over $50 million on curatorial activities, which               
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unexpected expenditures. In 1994, UCLA’s Armand Hammer Museum of Art 
sold a Leonardo da Vinci manuscript for $30. million to help pay for legal 
fees incurred in disputes over the Hammer estate.41 In more extreme cases, a 
museum may be obliged to sell artwork to save itself from bankruptcy, and 
that choice is less about fundraising than it is about maintaining solvency. A 
fine example of a desperate deaccession occurred in 200, when the National 
Academy Museum sold two paintings to pay for operations and to exhibit 
more of its holdings; the museum had struggled with financial problems for 
years and its Director explained that selling the paintings was the only way to 
keep the museum open.42
Another recent case of deaccession in dire times is Brandeis University’s 
decision to close its art museum and sell the entire collection to cope with 
operating deficits from the financial crisis.43 But unlike stand-alone art 
museums toward which boards owe fiduciary duties, the university art 
museum is a unit of the university; the university’s board owes fiduciary 
duties to the entire university,44 not to the museum as such. This complicates 
the legal analysis because the museum’s interest may conflict with the 
university’s interest, and the board, as the university’s fiduciary, must consider 
the latter. Understandably, universities do not see themselves as part of the 
includes conservation, cataloguing, curatorial departments, and scholarly publications; the sum 
is a $2 million increase from the year before and represents 29 % of the museum’s operating 
expenses. In the same year, maintenance and operating expenses accounted for 1 % of the 
operating budget. Metro. Museum of Art, Annual Report 60, 62 (2007), available at <http://
www.metmuseum.org/annual_report/2006_2007/report_2006_2007.asp> [hereinafter Met 
Annual Report 2007]. The Los Angeles County Museum of Art spent $4.7 million on curatorial 
activities (about ten percent of the museum’s total expenses in 2007) and $12.4 million on 
operations and property maintenance (about 26 %). See Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 
�Combined Financial Statements for the Years Ended June 30, 2007 and 2006’, at 5, available 
at <http://www.lacma.org/info/pdf/m-fy07.pdf>. In 200, the National Gallery of Art, which 
does not deaccession, spent 37 % of the Gallery’s net operating costs on its collections. Nat’l 
Gallery of Art, �Financial Statement for the Year Ended September 30, 200’, at 3,  (Nov. 
200), available at <http://www.nga.gov/pdf/FY200FSPWC.pdf>.
41 Robert C. Lind   et al., Art and Museum Law: Cases and Materials 645 (2002).
42 Randy Kennedy, �National Academy Sells Two Hudson River School Paintings to Bolster Its             
Finances’, N.Y. Times, 5 Dec. 200, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/200/12/06/arts/
design/06acad.html?ref=design>. The National Academy, however, should be distinguished 
from the typical art museum: it is affiliated with a school and it acquires artwork only through 
donations, not purchases. Id. 
43 Daniel Grant, �Is the University’s Museum Just a Rose to be Plucked?’,            Wall St. J., 3 Feb. 2009, 
at D7. 
44 AAMD Professional Practices, above,    note 26, at 1 (recognising university art museums’ 
position within the overall university structure and that the Director should report to the 
governing board of the university). In the Brandeis case, the university’s board has power to 
close the Rose Art Museum without having to consult the Rose’s own board. See Statement 
of the Board of Overseers of the Rose Art Museum, 5 Feb. 2009, <http://www.brandeis.edu/
rose/boostatmentroseclosing2509.pdf> (last visited 13 Mar. 2009) (objecting strenuously to the 
Trustees of the University’s decision to close the Rose and sell the collection). The different 
fiduciary relationships involving the university art museum takes the topic beyond the scope of 
this article. It is the subject of my next research project.
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museum profession and do not always subscribe to that profession’s code of 
ethics.4 The result is that “the most vulnerable collections have belonged to 
university museums, where the core values of the university can trump those 
of the museum.”4 Perhaps that is why, when compared with stand-alone 
art museums, university museums are more likely to channel deaccession 
proceeds to the operating budget and violate professional norms.47 Although 
the legal analysis of university art museums and their fiduciaries is beyond 
the scope of this article, university art museums illustrate the impact of non-
legal rules and are relevant to understanding the complementarities of legal 
and non-legal rules in museum governance.
c. safeguards Within the museum Profession
For art museums whose existence is defined by the artworks they hold, 
deaccession is not a lightly made decision. Fallibility of judgment is “a real and 
haunting possibility for every museum that deaccessions.”4 Equally important 
is a sense of institutional integrity: museums hold their collections in the 
public trust not only for the present audience but also for future generations.49 
“The conservation, exhibition, and study of the collection are at the heart of 
a museum’s service to its community and to the public.”0 Were museums 
allowed to sell their collections to balance the budget, they would relinquish 
their basic role as cultural custodians and become little more than art and 
antiques dealers with non-profit status.1 To protect the profession’s integrity 
and minimise impulsive deaccessions, the museum profession provides two 
types of extra-legal safeguards: peer regulation and self regulation.52 
4 See below, Part II.C for a discussion of professional ethics codes; see also             <www.aamd.org/
about/members.php> for a list of members of this prominent art museum association.
4 Jori Finkel, �Whose Rules About Art Sales Are These, Anyway?’,          N.Y. Times, 24 Dec. 200, 
available at <http://www.nytimes.com/200/12/2/arts/design/2fink.html?ref=design>.
47 In addition to Brandeis, other recent university deaccessions include: Thomas Jefferson           
University Medical College’s 2006 deaccession of Thomas Eakins’s The Gross Clinic, an 
important work in the American oeuvre (two Philadelphia art museums managed to raise $6 
million to buy the work, after which the university deaccessioned two other Eakins); Randolph 
College deaccessioned four paintings in 2007, including George Bellows’s Men of the Docks, 
after financial difficulties forced it to spend from the endowment; and Fisk University in 2005 
had planned to deaccession Georgia O’Keeffe’s bequest to increase its budget, only to be told 
by a court that doing so violates the terms of O’Keeffe’s bequest). Id.
4 Weil, �Deaccessioning’, above, note 12, at 6.      
49 Telephone Interview with Erik Ledbetter, Director, International Program and Ethics, American           
Association of Museums. (10 Dec. 200) [hereinafter Ledbetter Interview]; AAMD, Practice 
of Deaccessioning, above, note 11 (“Art museums develop collections of works of art for the 
benefit of present and future generations.”).
0 Press Release, Ass’n of Art Museum Directors, Press Release on the National Academy             
Museum (5 Dec. 200), available at <http://www.aamd.org/newsroom/documents/
200AAMDStatementonNAM_FINAL.pdf> [hereinafter AAMD Press Release on National 
Academy].
1 Ledbetter Interview, above, note 49.    
52 William C. Boyd, ’Museum Accountability: Laws, Rules, Ethics, and Accreditation’ in           
Reinventing the Museum p. 351, at pp. 357-5 (Gail Anderson ed., 2004).
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Peer regulation is premised on the idea that deaccession proceeds should 
be used only for acquiring new works. It is comprised of accreditation 
and professional ethics codes. Accreditation is conducted by the American 
Association of Museums,3 whose code of ethics permits deaccession 
proceeds to be used only for acquisitions or for direct care of the collection.4 
To be accredited, museums must undergo a rigorous three-year process of self 
and peer evaluation. Accreditation signals to the profession and the public 
that the museum’s management is of the highest quality and that signal, in 
turn, assists the museum in securing loans and donations. The AAM may 
revoke accreditation when museums improperly use deaccession proceeds. 
Such professional censure could cost the museum’s Director and board their 
jobs. In 2003, the AAM’s Accreditation Commission stripped the Museum of 
Northern Arizona’s accreditation when the museum deaccessioned 21 objects 
and used the proceeds to correct an operating deficit.57 In response, the museum 
changed its board and Director, overhauled its institutional management, and 
eventually regained accreditation after a three-year evaluation.
The other component of peer regulation is a professional code of ethics. “An 
ethical code sets forth conduct that a profession considers essential in order to 
uphold the integrity of the profession.”59 Perhaps the most influential ethics 
code is that promulgated by the Association of Art Museum Directors. AAMD 
has 190 members, including Directors of prominent art museums such as the 
Museum of Modern Art and the Metropolitan, as well as Directors of well-
regarded regional museums such as the Albright-Knox Art Gallery.0 AAMD’s 
ethics code permits deaccessions, treating them as an acceptable collection-
management tool; the code also prescribes that “proceeds from a deaccessioned 
work are used only to acquire other works of art – the proceeds are never used as 
operating funds, to build a general endowment, or for any other expenses.”1 
3 AAM is the association of all museums, not just those devoted to visual art. Its members range                 
from art galleries to history museums to zoos.
4 Ledbetter Interview, above, note 49. Direct care includes better climate control and shelving,             
but not general operation support such as staff salary or fixing the front door. Id.
 Id.
 Id.; see also Boyd, above, note 52, at p. 360. The idea is that donors and institutional lenders are more 
willing to do business with an accredited museum because some of the due diligence required of such 
transactions has been completed during the accreditation stage. Ledbetter Interview, above, note 49.
57 Museum of N. Ariz., AAM Restores MNA’s Accreditation, available at          <www.musnaz.org/
trustees/aamaccredit.html> (last visited 10 Dec. 200).
 Id.; Museum of N. Ariz., AAM Accreditation Process, available at <www.musnaz.org/trustees/
accreditproc.html> (last visited 10 Dec. 200); Ledbetter Interview, above, note 49; see also 
Mark Sidel, The Guardians Guarding Themselves: A Comparative Perspective on Nonprofit 
Self-Regulation” 0 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 03, 29 (2005) (observing that “reputational effects of 
violation of norms are important negative incentives [for poor decisionmaking practices] even 
without financial or regulatory incentives” and pointing to the AAM as an example).
59 Marie C. Malaro,   Museum Governance: Mission, Ethics, Policy 17 (1994) [hereinafter Malaro, 
Museum Governance].
0 Ass’n of Art Museum Directors, Mission Statement, <       www.aamd.org/about/members.php> 
(last visited 17 Mar. 2009).
1 AAMD, Practice of Deaccessioning, above, note 11 (emphasis original).         
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Although not binding and although members such as the Hammer Museum 
have used sale proceeds to pay for operations, the ethics code nevertheless has 
persuasive power. Member museums have adopted their own �for acquisition 
only’ policies – MOMA’s deaccession procedures, for instance, provide that 
“[a]ll sales or exchanges of painting are made ad hoc for the sole purpose of 
obtaining another work.”62 In addition, member museums respond to AAMD’s 
censure. After the AAMD formally condemned the Fogg Art Museum’s 
plan to use deaccession proceeds to fund construction of its new wing, the 
museum cancelled the intended deaccession.3 When the Phillips Collection 
announced it would sell Braque’s cubist work Le Violon to increase its general 
endowment fund, the AAMD objected; although the Braque was eventually 
deaccessioned, the Phillips channelled the proceeds to its acquisitions 
fund – a move permitted by AAMD’s ethics code.4 
Beyond peer regulation, museums self regulate by promulgating formal 
collection policies. Museums, after all, are selling their own assets – assets 
often irreplaceable and irrecoverable once sold – and have every incentive to 
ensure the decision is not made rashly or capriciously. The National Gallery 
of Art, a governmental creation, is among a handful of museums that do 
not deaccession. Most museums permit deaccession and have collection 
policies that outline specific procedures to be followed before a work can 
be deaccessioned. These procedures generally follow professional ethics 
guidelines and restrict the use of deaccession proceeds to acquisitions. In 
general, deaccession procedures permit only curators or Directors to initiate 
the deaccession process, specifies how boards should inform themselves of 
all material information, requires consultation of outside experts when objects 
under consideration are particularly valuable, and compels boards to exercise 
general care by building in opportunities for reconsideration.  
62 �Deaccession Procedures for the Museum of Modern Art (Painting and Sculpture)’, reprinted            
in Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, above, note 1, at p. 1277 [hereinafter MOMA Deaccession 
Procedures]. Examples of other museums that restrict deaccession proceeds for acquisition 
include The Philadelphia Museum of Art, the Art Institute of Chicago, and Boston’s Museum 
of Fine Arts. Philadelphia Museum of Art, Collection Policy (confidential and unpublished 
material; on file with author) [hereinafter PMA Deaccession Policy]; Art Institute of Chicago, 
Deaccession Policy (confidential and unpublished material; on file with author) [hereinafter 
Art Institute of Chicago Deaccession Policy]; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Collection Policy 
(2005) (confidential and unpublished material; on file with author) [hereinafter MFA Boston 
Collection Policy].
3 See Weil, �Deaccessioning’, above, note 12, at p. 65.
4 See id. at pp. 65-66.
 Nat’l Gallery of Art, above, note 40, at . Some private museums – such as the Isabella Stewart                  
Gardner Museum or the Barnes Foundation – are dedicated to preserving a specific collection 
and thus do not have to worry about acquisitions or deaccessions. For instance, Isabella 
Stewart Gardner’s will stipulated that no work from her museum’s collection can be removed 
and no acquisitions are allowed (though recently Massachusetts’s Supreme Court permitted 
the museum to reasonably deviate from Gardner’s will). Abby Goodnough, �The Gardner, A 
Wounded Museum Feels a Jolt of Progress’, N.Y. Times, 13 Mar. 2009, available at <http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/arts/design/15good.html?_r=1>; see also above, note 23.
 See below, Part IV for a more detailed discussion of the content of deaccession policies.              
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D. the organisation and its cast of characters
The American art museum is a complex organisation of “people, functions 
and relationships.” 67 It is run by three distinctive groups: the board, the 
Director, and the curators. Each group performs a specialised function. The 
relationships among them – particularly that between the board and the 
Director – shape the museum’s management structure. That relationship is 
also integral to understanding the board’s role in deaccessions.
Most art museums are either non-profit corporations or charitable trusts and, 
depending on their legal form, are governed by a board of directors or of 
trustees. The board oversees the museum and is responsible for establishing 
the museum’s general policy, managing finances, taking care of physical assets 
(including the art collection and the building), and appointing the Director.69 
The Director is the museum’s chief executive officer and implements 
the board’s policies in addition to conducting the museum’s day-to-day 
operations.70 Both the Director and the curators are part of the museum’s 
professional staff. Curators, hired by the Director, 71 are in charge of the 
acquisition, care, and display of collections.72 Curators lobby the Director to 
prioritise their curatorial department or to enlist the Director to convince the 
Board to support a particular acquisition. In turn, Directors depend on curators 
to run their departments and help them secure donations and loans.73 
67 Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, above, note 1, at p. 1194. This observation is not to deny the 
importance of other museum personnel such as the registrar, conservators, business staff, and 
others; but it is the trinity consisting of the board, the Director, and the curators that makes 
all the decisions critical to managing an art museum and thus they and their relationships are 
scrutinised here.
 White, above, note 9, at p. 104. Other less common legal forms that art museums take include                 
government trust (the Smithsonian Institution), or state agency (North Carolina Museum of 
Art). 
69 Grace Glueck, �Power and Esthetics: The Trustee’,       Art in America pp. 7-3 (Jul-Aug. 1971), 
reprinted in Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, above, note 1, at pp. 1194, 1195; see also, e.g., Los 
Angeles County Museum of Art, Bylaws of Museum Associates Art. V § 7, available at <http://
www.lacma.org/info/pdf/bylawsjune05.pdf> [hereinafter LACMA Bylaws] (“[The Director] 
shall be selected by the Board of Trustees . . .  and shall report to the Board of Trustees . . . .”); 
Calvin Tomkins, �I Remember MOMA’, New Yorker, 25 Sept. 2006, at pp. 126, 131 [hereinafter 
Tomkins, �MOMA’] (mentioning that Directors are hired and fired by MOMA’s board).
70 Ass’n of Art Museum Directors, Good Governance and Non-Profit Integrity (June 2006), at             
2, <http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/GoodGovernance_Final.pdf>; see also LACMA 
Bylaws, above, note 69, at Art. V § 7 (“The Director shall be the chief executive officer of the 
corporation . . . .”).
71 See, e.g., LACMA Bylaws,    above, note 69, at Art. V § 7 (“[The Director] shall have the powers 
and duties of administration and management usually vested in the chief executive officer of a 
corporation . . . .”; Hoving, Making the Mummies Dance, above, note 3, at pp. 76-79 (describing 
Hoving’s rationale for hiring or firing certain curators).
72 Association of Art Museum Curators, <     http://www.artcurators.org/> (last visited 16 Feb. 
200).
73 See, e.g., Hoving,   Making the Mummies Dance, above, note 3, at 6-2, for a Director’s view 
of his relationship with curators; see also Carol Vogel, �Director (and Voice) of Met Museum 
of Retire’, N.Y.Times, 9 Jan. 200, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/200/01/09/arts/
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The Director, as the public face of the museum, leads fundraising campaigns 
and socialises with potential donors in hopes of persuading them to part with 
their money, art collections, or both.74 Though the board is the museum’s 
governing body, frequently it is the Director’s personality and artistic vision that 
shape the museum.75 Thomas Hoving, a “brilliant showman and populizer,”76 
transformed the “slumbering” Metropolitan into an “insatiable, acquisitive, 
blockbuster-besotted” modern museum.77 In contrast, his successor, the 
erudite and �Old World’ Philippe de Montebello, focused on displaying the 
museum’s permanent collection7 and ran acclaimed, scholarly exhibitions,79 
but was criticised for slighting contemporary art.0 
Board members are the monied elite on whom the museum relies for major 
donations or hosting fundraisers; many come from business and finance; 1 
many have superb art collections2 that the museum one day hopes to obtain. 
Contemporary boards are criticised for running a museum the way they run 
their corporations, focusing on balancing the budget rather than on art. 3 The 
design/09muse.html> (noting the close collaboration between Philippe de Montebello, the 
Metropolitan’s former Director, and museum curators).
74 For a scathing and hilarious account of a former Metropolitan Director’s escapades trying to              
woo donors, see generally Hoving, Making the Mummies Dance, above, note 3.
75 Or, as the AAMD puts it, “nurtures the intellectual and aesthetic philosophy of the museum.”               
AAMD Professional Practices, above, note 26, at p. 11.
76 Charles McGrath, �Twilight of the Sun King’,       N.Y.Times, 29 July 2007, at <http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/07/29/arts/design/29mcgr.html?_r=1&ref=design>.
77 Michael Kimmelman, �The Legacy of a Pragmatic Custodian of Human Civilization’,            N.Y. Times, 
9 Jan. 200, <http://www.nytimes.com/200/01/09/arts/design/09kimm.html?ref=design>.
7 See Vogel, above, note 73.
79 See Rachel Donadio, �What Awaits the Met’, N.Y. Times, 13 Jan. 200, available at <http://
www.nytimes.com/200/01/13/weekinreview/13donadio.html?ref=weekinreview> (“Mr. de 
Montebello is leaving strong, following . . . a run of well-attended, scholarly, rigorous and 
critically acclaimed exhibitions.”).
0 See  Kimmelman, above, note 77 (“What the art world complained most about was the inattention 
to living artists, reflecting Mr. de Montebello’s own discomfort with contemporary art.”); see 
also Tomkins, �MOMA’, above, note 69 for an account of how the appointment of Glenn Lowry 
as MOMA’s Director changed that museum’s approach to collecting and displaying art.
1 See Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, above, note 1, at 1196 (observing the continuing trend 
that museum boards remain “predominantly white, older, wealthy, business and professional 
in background, and socially and politically influential.”). One member of the Metropolitan’s 
acquisition committee notes that after curatorial presentations of potential objects for acquisition, 
sometimes a board member will “step up and offer to personally fund a purchase that is costly, but 
particularly important to the [D]irector or one of our curators.” Danny Danziger, Museum: Behind 
the Scenes at the Metropolitan Museum of Art p. 194 (2007) (quoting Annette de la Renta).
2 According to Hoving, acquisition committee members are “chosen for their special knowledge            
or their great interest in works of art. Many of them are connoisseurs in their own right, having 
private collections with great distinction.” Hoving, �The Chase’, above, note 1, at p. 2.
3 See, e.g., Tomkins, �MOMA’, above, note 69, at pp. 131,135 (profiling MOMA’s management,             
particularly of its Director, Glenn Lowry, who “proved to be a dazzlingly effective C.E.O.” and 
whom some blamed for the “�corporate’ transformation of MOMA’s culture.”); Andrew Decker, 
�The State of Museums: Cautious Optimism Prevails’, Museum News pp. 24-25, 33 (Mar/Apr 
19) (describing the state of American museums as a “time of marketing and finance” and 
quoting complaints that board members are now populated by businessmen who “are there 
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accusation is not entirely fair. No longer are art museums just galleries with 
artwork. Responsible planning and management – of expensive building 
projects, of multi-million dollar acquisitions, of the museum’s endowment 
– require financial savvy and an eye on the bottom line. The consequences 
of prioritising art above the budget are painfully illustrated by the Museum 
of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles. Under Director Jeremy Strick, the 
museum built an impressive collection of post-war art and organised “some 
of the most serious and ambitious contemporary art exhibitions anywhere.”4 
But in “putting art ahead of the bottom line,” MOCA chronically overspent 
its budget and was forced to draw down the principal of its endowment as 
well as borrow from donor-restricted accounts to pay for operating costs. 
Nearing financial collapse, MOCA had to accept a $30-million bailout from 
philanthropist Eli Broad. Thus, fiscal responsibility is a necessary ingredient 
in sound museum governance.
The Director-board relationship is one of checks and balances. Directors 
and, to a lesser extent, curators drive collection management while the 
board retains ultimate decisionmaking power. Proposals for acquiring or 
deaccessioning an object are almost always initiated by the curator and 
submitted by the Director to the board for approval.7 Some Directors have 
great personal authority among board members and enjoy much freedom in 
acquisitions. Indeed, because museums often compete with other buyers on 
the art market, freedom to make instantaneous decisions gives Directors an 
advantage during bidding or negotiations. For example, the Metropolitan’s 
de Montebello concedes that though he had spoken to some key board members 
beforehand about buying Duccio’s Madonna and Child, he did not technically 
have the necessary board authority when he made an on-the-spot offer to the 
auction house. For de Montebello, an official approval was probably never 
in question, because as one curator describes, “[i]f [de Montebello] wants 
more for status than anything else” and whose priority is financial health rather than art).
4 Edward Wyatt & Jori Finkel, �Soaring in Art, Museum Trips Over Finances’,            N.Y. Times, 5 Dec. 
200, at A1.
 Id.; Mike Boehm, �Museum in Deep Financial Trouble’, L.A. Times, 19 Nov. 200, available at 
<http://articles.latimes.com/200/nov/19/entertainment/et-moca19>.
 Hoving, �The Chase’, above, note 1, at p. 30.        
7 See, e.g ., AAMD Professional Practices, above, note 26, at p. 5 (“The [D]irector and curatorial 
staff are responsible for identifying possible acquisitions made through purchase. No work 
of art may be considered for acquisition without the recommendation of the [D]irector.”); 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, Collections Management Policy (12 Nov. 200), at 3, available 
at <http://www.metmuseum.org/works_of_art/collection_database/collections_mgmt_policy.
pdf> [hereinafter Met Collections Policy]. Sometimes the board will bring a potential candidate 
for acquisition to the curator or Director’s notice.
 Tomkins, �Madonna’, above, note 32, at p. 49; see also          Met Collections Policy, above, note 
7 (requiring all purchases over $100,000 to be approved by the acquisitions committee). De 
Montebello explained his offer was to Christie’s, not to the seller; by the time the seller received 
the offer, the Metropolitan’s board had approved the acquisition. Tomkins, �Madonna’, above, 
note 32, at p. 49.
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something, and the trustees know he wants it – I had no doubt that the funds 
could be found.”9 
But museum boards are hardly in the business of rubber-stamping Directors’ 
recommendations. Boards have power over the Director and are not shy about 
using it. Because major decisions such as acquisition, loans and deaccessions 
(not to mention the hiring and firing of the Director) require board votes,90 
boards can check the Director and curators if the board believes a proposal 
is inappropriate. Both the acquisition and deaccession processes give boards 
opportunities to question curators and Directors about their proposals and 
to make the final authorisation. Long before the Metropolitan acquired its 
current Duccio, Hoving wanted to buy Duccio’s The Crucifixion; the board 
authorised him to bid but later rescinded its authorisation.91 (That painting 
is no longer attributed to Duccio.) When Hoving and his curators proposed 
deaccessioning a long list of works to pay for Juan de Pareja, the acquisitions 
committee approved some proposals but vetoed others.92 Boards have also got 
rid of Directors for poor management: MOMA’s board forced Director Bates 
Lowry to resign for, among other things, running a deficit; the board then 
fired Lowry’s successor after he mishandled union strikes at the museum.93 
III. the VIew from the bAr: the fIduCIAry dutIeS of muSeum boArdS
Board members of art museums – be they corporate directors or 
trustees – have fiduciary duties to the museum and its collections. But 
whereas the �trust standard’ tests the prudence of trustee conduct, the more 
lax �business judgment rule’ presumes propriety of the corporate director’s 
business decisions. For the corporate director, the effective check on his 
conduct comes not from the corporate standard, but from shareholder votes 
and lawsuits. A problem arises when an entity’s legal form is a non-profit 
corporation, whose �shareholders’ have neither voting power nor standing to 
sue. States disagree whether the conduct of non-profit directors should be 
assessed under the corporate standard or under the trust standard.94 Some 
9 Id. at p. 4. Before the auction for Juan de Pareja, Hoving successfully convinced the board to 
raise the maximum bid from £2 million, to £2 million plus one bid back to the museum. Hoving, 
�The Chase’, above, note 1, at p. 39. It was on this additional bid that the Metropolitan won the 
painting. Id. at p. 40. For more on acquisitions at the Metropolitan, see The Chase, the Capture: 
Collecting at the Metropolitan, above, note 1.
90 See, e.g ., LACMA Bylaws, above, note 69, at Art. IV, § 14(b) (providing that the acquisitions 
committee’s job includes approving all acquisitions, deaccessions, and major loans).
91 Tomkins, �Madonna’, above, note 32, at p. 49.       
92 For example, at one point the board cancelled the sale of a Rousseau and postponed the decision                 
on other paintings. Eventually, the Rousseau was deaccessioned but other works on the proposed 
deaccession list were not. Hoving, Making the Mummies Dance, above, note 3, at pp. 300-01. In 
another Velazquez-related deaccession, the board voted to deaccession three German expressionist 
paintings, but not without tough questions from board members. Id. at 294.
93 Charlie Finch, �How to Fire a MOMA Director’, artnet, 2 July 200, available at <http://www.              
artnet.com/magazine/features/FINCH/FINCH7-2-00.asp>.
94 Id.; George Gleason Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 394 (rev. 3rd edn, 200). 
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commentators propose applying the trust standard regardless of the museum’s 
legal form. This section first examines the fiduciary duties of trustees and 
corporate directors;95 it then turns to the debate over the appropriate standard 
of care for non-profit corporate directors, before considering critique of the 
business judgment rule in a non-profit context and proposals to impose a 
uniform trust standard on museum board members.
A. fiduciary Duties of corporate Directors and of trustees
In corporate law, the business decision of directors is evaluated under the 
business judgment rule. The rule presumes propriety and imposes a rational-
basis review to business decisions made with reasonable care and without 
conflict of interest.96 Because the business judgment rule is a rule of abstention 
that essentially prevents courts from reviewing the substance of the decision,97 
few directors are ever found liable.9 If, however, the plaintiff can show that 
the director breached either the duty of care or the duty of loyalty, the business 
judgment rule no longer applies. 99 
The duty of care requires decisions be made in a reasonable manner – directors 
must “act on an informed basis”100 and “inform [themselves] of all material 
information that is reasonably available to them.”101 Breach of care is evaluated 
95 The fiduciary obligation encompasses both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. E.g.,               Schoon 
v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 206 (Del. 200). The duty of loyalty bars self-interested transactions or 
other conflicts of interest. The duty of care, in contrast, assumes disinterest and asks whether 
the actor exercised the proper care in making that decision. Because loyalty raises a different set 
of concerns and problems seem to occur less frequently in the deaccession context, this Article 
will, with the exception of the discussion on good faith, focus solely on the standard of care. 
This is not to say that loyalty problems do not exist. Indeed, trustee acquisition of deaccessioned 
works presents a classic instance of conflict of interest under fiduciary law. Merryman recounts 
such an instance afflicting the Museum of the American Indian in New York City. See Law, 
Ethics and the Visual Arts, above, note 1, at p. 1227.
96 See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 20 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“A board of directors enjoys a 
presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be 
attributed to any rational business purpose.”); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) 
(“Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.”).
97 Edward Brodsky & M. Patricia Adamski,      Law of Corporate Officers and Directors: Rights, 
Duties and Liabilities § 2:10 (2007).
9 See below, note 120.   
99 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 05, 12 (Del. 194), overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 746 
A.2d at 244; see also Paramount Communic’ns v. QVC Network, 637 A. 2d 34, 46 (Del. 1994) 
(“where the traditional business judgment rule is applicable . . . the Court gives great deference 
to the substance of the directors’ decision”).
100 See, e.g ., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A. 2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993); Benihana of Tokyo, 
Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 91 A. 2d 150, 192 (Del. Ch. 2006) (articulating the rule that corporate 
directors must “inform themselves . . . of all material information reasonably available to them.”); 
Model Business Corp. Act § .31(a)(2)(ii)(B) (2002) (providing that liability may arise when the 
challenged conduct resulted from a decision to which “the director was not informed to an extent 
the director reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstances”) [hereinafter MBCA].
101 Cede & Co., 634 A. 2d at 367 (internal citations omitted) (discussing duty of care in mergers or 
sales).
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under a gross negligence standard,102 which means “reckless indifference to or 
a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders or actions which are 
without the bounds of reason.”103 To overcome the presumption of the business 
judgment rule, the plaintiff must show that the director failed to “adequately 
apprise himself of the information material to the decision in question.”104 
Breach of care, however, does not automatically give rise to liability; it only 
removes the business judgment rule and its presumptions of propriety.
Although the duty of care is distinct from the duty of loyalty, the good faith 
component of loyalty is implicated in the director’s decision-making process. 
Good faith obliges corporate directors to ensure that adequate mechanisms 
exist within the corporation to provide them with “timely, accurate information 
sufficient . . . to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s 
compliance with law and its business performance.”10 Breach of good faith 
occurs when there is a “sustained or systematic failure” to establish reasonable 
information and reporting systems.10 This is not a demanding standard, since 
ordinary failure is not enough to establish breach; rather, the failure must 
have been sustained and extreme.107 As with the duty of care, breach of good 
faith deprives directors of the protection of the business judgment rule.
On top of their discretion under gross negligence and good faith, directors 
may shield themselves from fiduciary breaches. Both the Model Business 
Corporation Act and Delaware’s corporate statute permit corporations to limit 
the liability of directors who breach the standard of care.10 And, in addition 
to limited liability, directors may be indemnified if they acted in good faith 
and in reasonable belief the action was in the corporation’s best interest.109 
Together, the gross negligence standard and immunity create little structural 
incentive for directors to take scrupulous care.110
102 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 4 A. 2d 5, 73 (Del. 195). 
103 Benihana, 91 A. 2d at 192 (internal citation omitted).
104 Kahn ex rel DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. Roberts, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, at *11 (Del. Ch. 
1995).
10 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 69 A. 2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
10 Id. at 971.
107 See id. (“only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight – such as an 
utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists – will 
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”) (emphasis added). 
Detail of system design, however, is a business decision and accorded the same deference as are 
other business decisions. Id. at 970.
10 MBCA, above, note 100, at § 2.02(b)(4); Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 102(b)(7).             
109 MBCA, above, note 100, at § .51; Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 145. It is more accurate to say that                    
directors do not have a right to indemnification under these provisions; rather, the corporation has 
the power but not obligation to indemnify its directors. The MBCA provides that corporations 
“may indemnify” and the Delaware statute similarly states that corporations “shall have the 
power to indemnify” directors.
110 It is, however, interesting to observe that in practice, after          Smith v. Van Gorkom, corporations 
seem to err on the side of caution and do everything the Transunion board failed to do to guard 
against a finding of gross negligence.
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The trust standard of care obliges a fiduciary to “manifest the care, skill, 
prudence, and diligence of an ordinarily prudent man engaged in similar 
business affairs and with objective similar to those of the trust in question.”111 
The same prudence standard also applies to trustees of a charitable trust, 
whose beneficiary is the public.112 Unlike corporate law’s gross-negligence 
standard, the trust standard of care turns on ordinary negligence.113 Whereas 
corporate law merely requires decisions to be made in a reasonable manner, 
the trust standard articulates the steps trustees must follow in the decision-
making process. These steps include: making proper investigations, using 
sufficient safeguards, complying with internal procedures, considering expert 
advice where appropriate, and generally exercising ordinary skill, care, and 
caution.114 Compared with the corporate �reasonable manners’ requirement, 
the trust standard is less flexible and provides greater clarity. Corporate 
directors satisfy their duty of care if they are reasonably informed; the rule 
is not concerned about precisely how they became informed.11 In contrast, 
under the trust standard, trustees must satisfy specific procedural safeguards 
to not breach their duty of care.11 Further, the “test of prudence is one of 
111 Bogert, above, note 94, at § 541. Case law and statutes differ on precisely what “similar business                 
affairs” means. The Uniform Probate Code sets the standard at that observed by the “prudent 
man dealing with the property of another.” Id. (quoting the Uniform Probate Code) (emphasis 
added). Case law generally requires trustees to exercise the degree of care observed by a prudent 
man “dealing with his own property.” Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 174 (1959) (emphasis 
added); see also Estate of Beach, 15 Cal. 3d 623, 631 (Cal. 1975). The MBCA uses similar 
language to describe the director’s standard of conduct: members of the board “shall discharge 
their duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate 
under similar circumstances.” MBCA, above, note 100, at § .30(b). However, this language 
is absent in the provision governing the director’s standard of liability. Id. at § .31. Further, 
case law interprets the corporate standard to be one of gross negligence (under the business 
judgment rule) while the trust standard is one of ordinary negligence.
112 Bogert, above, note 94, at §§ 394, 363 (discussing beneficiaries of the charitable trust).             
113 See, e.g ., Stern v. Lucy Webb Nat’l Training Sch. For Deaconesses and Missionaries, 31 F. 
Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974) (“A trustee is uniformly held to a high standard of care and 
will be held liable for simple negligence, while a director must often have committed �gross 
negligence’”); see also Bogert, above, note 94, at § 394.
114 See, e.g ., Bogert, above, note 94, at § 541 (“The standard of care applicable to trustees would appear 
to include at least two elements. The element of initiative or effort refers to those acts necessary to 
the collection and preservation of the trust assets, and to the seeking of qualified assistance where 
necessary for the proper administration of the trust. The element of skill or judgment . . . appear[s] to 
include the use of proper safeguards and internal procedures as well as consideration of the advice 
of specialists or experts where necessary to make informed decisions.”); First Alabama Bank of 
Montgomery v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 426-27 (Ala. 192) (listing the procedural steps that satisfy 
prudence); Estate of Collins, 72 Cal. App. 3d 663, 670-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (requiring trustees to 
investigate the financial status of their purchase and of those with whom they do business); see also 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 77 cmts. a & b (2003). 
11 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A. 2d 345, 36 (Del. 1993) (“a trial court will not 
find a board to have breached its duty of care unless the directors individually and the board 
collectively have failed to inform themselves fully and in a deliberate manner before voting as 
a board upon a transaction as significant as a proposed merger or sale of the company.”).
11 For instance, in   First Alabama Bank, the trustee-bank was liable for losses to the trust principle; 
it had purchased securities in contravention of its own minimum investment safety standards. 
425 So.2d at 419.
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conduct not of performance.”117 Breach turns on whether the trustee’s conduct 
was prudent, not on the result of that conduct.11 That is, so long as the trustee 
dutifully investigates, considers expert advice where appropriate, follows 
internal guidelines, and generally exercises care, his decision is considered 
prudent and is not evaluated on its merits.119 In some ways, the prudence 
standard operates like the business judgment rule, whereby the substance of 
the decision is not subject to review so long as the procedure is adequate. 
The difference is that the trust standard is procedurally more exacting. More 
importantly, because a trustee’s actions are not presumed proper, breach of 
care by a trustee results in liability; in contrast, a corporate director’s breach 
of care only lifts the presumption of propriety.120
Trustees, like corporate directors, may be exculpated from breaches of care. 
Trust instruments can exculpate the trustee for certain conduct, and the typical 
exculpatory clause relieves trustees of liability for all acts other than gross 
negligence or willful default.121 Though courts dislike such clauses, the modern 
trend is to accept exculpatory clauses so long as they do not immunise trustees 
from all liability.122 In addition, the Uniform Trust Code permits exculpation 
for trustees acting in good faith and without reckless indifference.123 The 
consequence is that although the default trust standard is ordinary negligence, 
a trustee may be liable only for gross negligence (not unlike the un-immunised 
corporate director). It is, however, harder for the trustee to successfully invoke 
117 Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above,note 114, at § 77 cmt. a.
11 Id.
119 See, e.g ., Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 193) (“courts have focused 
the inquiry under the �prudent man’ rule on a review of the fiduciary’s independent investigation 
of the merits of a particular investment, rather than on an evaluation of the merits alone.”); Ethan 
G. Stone, �Must We Teach Abstinence? Pensions’ Relationship Investments and the Lessons of 
Fiduciary Duty’, 94 Colum. L.Rev. 2222, n.11 (1994) (internal citations omitted) (“the test of 
prudence – the Prudent Man Rule – is one of conduct, and not a test of the result of performance 
of the investment. The focus of the inquiry is how the fiduciary acted in his selection of the 
investment, and not whether his investments succeeded or failed.”).
120 See, e.g ., Jones v. Ellis, 551 So. 2d 396, 402 (Ala. 199) (“a trustee is liable for losses occasioned 
by his mere imprudent management of the trust.”). But see Pederzani v. Guerriere, 4 Mass L. 
Rep. 447, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Mass. 1995) (applying the business judgment rule to conduct of 
trustees of a condominium trust). Under these circumstances, it is unsurprising that trustees are 
more frequently found personally liable for breach of care than their corporate counterparts. 
Compare Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, �The Challenge of Company Stock Transactions 
for Directors’ Duty of Loyalty’, 43 Harv. J. on Legis. 437, 442 & n.26 (2006) (noting the 
paucity of cases – fewer than ten – in which corporate directors are held liable for violating the 
standard of care), and Andrew S. Gold, �A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment 
Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty’, 66 Md. L. Rev. 39, 472 
(2007) (observing that in Delaware, “the few cases in which allegations of gross negligence 
alone enabled a plaintiff to rebut the business judgment rule are outliers.”), with Bogert, above, 
note 94, at § 541 (summarising a number of cases in which the trustee was found to have 
breached the standard of care).
121 Bogert, above, note 94, at § 542.      
122 Id.
123 Uniform Trust Code § 100(a) (2001).     
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immunity than it is for the corporate director. Not only must the trustee’s 
conduct fall within the protective scope of the exculpatory clause, but courts 
also strictly construe these clauses against the trustee.124 Further, trustees are 
only indemnified for “expenses properly incurred in the administration of the 
trust”125 – expenses that, “in the exercise of fiduciary judgment, are reasonable 
and appropriate in carrying out the purposes of the trust, serving the interests 
of the beneficiaries, and generally performing the functions and responsibilities 
of the trusteeship.”126 Should the trustee breach fiduciary duty, he receives no 
indemnification.127 Consequently, a trustee, when compared with a corporate 
director, is less insulated against the legal liabilities of breach and consequently 
has stronger incentives to refrain from breach.
B. Which Standard? The Debate over Non-Profit Corporate Directors
The non-profit corporation is something of a hybrid, sporting characteristics 
of both corporations and trusts. Like a business corporation, it is a legal 
entity that exists independently of its members.12 But though non-profit 
corporations do make profits, they cannot distribute their earnings.129 Unlike 
its for-profit counterpart, a non-profit corporation has no shareholders to vote 
for board members or to sue them.130 This is because a non-profit corporation’s 
beneficiaries, like those of a charitable trust, are the public at large; but 
because members of the public and professional associations have no direct 
financial interest in charitable trusts or non-profit corporations, they have no 
standing to sue.131 That is, neither museum professionals nor the public can 
file lawsuits against the board alleging breach of fiduciary duty. Instead, the 
state attorney general oversees the state’s non-profit organisations and may 
prosecute charitable trustees and non-profit directors for breaches of fiduciary 
duty.132 
124 Bogert, above, note 94, at § 542.      
125 Restatement (Third) of Trusts, above, note 114, at § 3.
126 Id. at §  cmt. b.
127 Bogert observes that trust property cannot be used to pay legal expenses caused by the trustee’s                
wrongful act. Bogert, above, note 94, at § 09, n.43. Whether a trustee will have to pay for his 
legal expenses depends on the outcome of the litigation: if he prevails in a breach of trust suit, 
his costs are borne by the trust principle, but if he is removed, he is responsible for his own 
expenses. Id. at § 09.
12 White, above, note 9, at p. 1050.      
129 Rev. Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 13.01 [hereinafter RMNCA].        
130 White, above, note 9, at pp. 1050-51; see also         Marion Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit 
Organizations: Federal and State Law and Regulation p. 233 (2004) (noting that non-profit 
corporations “lack �watchdog’ shareholders with an equity incentive to police the actions of 
board members”).
131 See Gerstenblith, above, note 10, at 199-200. Standing to sue non-profit corporations has been 
expanded on a limited basis, and some states recognise standing for university alumni and 
faculty (but not current students), and certain taxpayer claims. Malaro, A Legal Primer, above, 
note 12, at pp. 27-29. But standing remains elusive for members of the general public wishing 
to sue museums for mismanagement. Id. at pp. 30-33.
132 Id. at pp. 23, 2.
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Historically, non-profit directors were held to the trust standard.133 When 
states began to regulate the non-profit sector, they often imported corporate 
standards wholesale134 and the business judgment rule was used to evaluate 
the conduct of non-profit corporate directors.13 Although the Model Nonprofit 
Corporate Act’s standard of care requires directors to act “with the care that 
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances”,13 there is no specified procedural requirement beyond that 
directors be “reasonably acquainted with matters demanding their attention, 
and at a minimum must attend meetings and review and understand material 
submitted to the board.”137 Today, though some states still use the trust rule,13 
the trend in non-profit fiduciary law is to apply the corporate standard and its 
attendant business judgment rule.139 
A non-profit director’s immunity has characteristics of both trust and corporate 
law. Although the RMNCA does not limit director liability, some states 
permit non-profit corporations to immunise their directors for conduct other 
than gross negligence;140 in this respect, the non-profit standard is like a trust 
instrument immunising ordinary negligence. However, the RMNCA follows 
133 Lee, above note 10, at p. 926.       
134 See id. at p. 932 (“In most states, nonprofit corporate statutes closely parallel those governing 
business corporations and may be even more permissive.”). 
13 See, e.g.,  Stern v. Lucy Webb Nat’l Training Sch. For Deaconesses and Missionaries, 31 F. 
Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974) (“the modern trend is to apply corporate rather than trust 
principles in determining the liability of the directors of charitable corporations, because their 
functions are virtually indistinguishable from those of their �pure’ corporate counterparts.”); 
Rywalt v. Writer Corp. 34 Colo. App. 334, 337 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974) (“The good faith acts of 
directors of profit or non-profit corporations which are within the powers of the corporation and 
within the exercise of an honest business judgment are valid.”) questioned by RTC v. Heiserman 
39 F. Supp. 1457 (D. Colo. 1993).
13 RMNCA, above, note 129, at § .30(a).      
137 Fremont-Smith, above, note 130, at 203.     
13 Compare 15 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 5547 (West 200) (holding non-profit corporate directors to               
the trust standard), with Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-70 (2009) (“A director shall discharge his duties 
as a director . . . in accordance with his good faith business judgment of the best interests of the 
corporation.”); see also Bogart, above, note 94, at § 394 (noting the uncertainty surrounding 
which standard to apply to assess the duties of non-profit corporate directors). 
139 Bogert, above, note 94, at § 361; Marilyn E. Phelan, Nonprofit Enterprises: Corporations, 
Trusts, and Associations § 4.09 (2000) (“The current trend is to apply corporate rather than trust 
principles in determining the legal liability of directors of charitable corporations based on the 
concept that their functions are virtually indistinguishable from those of their �pure’ corporate 
counterparts.”); Jaclyn A. Cherry, �Update: The Current State of Nonprofit Director Liability’, 
37 Duq. L. Rev. 557, 560 (1999) (“Although courts have historically looked to trust law as 
the basis for defining director liability, most recently, courts have begun to look to nonprofit 
corporate law.”).
140 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 5239(a) (Deering 200) (providing no liability for volunteer              
directors of non-profit corporations if their acts were in good faith and “not reckless, wanton, 
intentional, or grossly negligent”); 05 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 105/10.70 (LexisNexis 2009) 
(limiting the liability of unpaid directors of tax-exempt organizations to only acts of “willful 
or wanton conduct”); N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 720-a (Consol. 2009) (limiting liability 
of unpaid directors of tax-exempt organizations to only acts of gross negligence or intentional 
harm).
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the MBCA by allowing a non-profit corporation to indemnify its directors if 
they acted in good faith and reasonably believed their conduct did not oppose 
the corporation’s best interests.141
Most art museums are non-profit corporations.142 Thus the applicable 
standard of care in deaccession cases depends on the jurisdiction in which 
the case is brought. For example, board members of Buffalo’s Albright-Knox 
Art Gallery were sued when they changed the museum’s collecting focus 
and deaccessioned over 200 works of art.143 Since New York law applies 
the business judgment rule to non-profit corporations, the judge engaged in 
minimal judicial review and quickly concluded that “those actions taken by a 
board of directors in good faith in the exercise of honest judgment and within 
legitimate corporate purposes cannot be overturned by a court.”144 
c. Proposing a trust standard of care 
Responding to the different standards of care across states and the unique 
characteristics of non-profit corporations, some art-law commentators 
recommend applying the trust standard to evaluate the conduct of non-profit 
directors,14 articulating three main reasons for this recommendation. First, 
museums with non-profit corporate status are functionally equivalent to 
charitable trusts: 
Evaluating the conduct of museum [board members] in dissimilar 
ways based merely upon differences in organizational form 
improperly elevates form over function because the choice of 
organizational form has no [e]ffect on the service that museums 
141 RMNCA, above, note 129, at § .51(a).      
142 Malaro, A Legal Primer, above, note 12, at p. 4.
143 Dennis v. Buffalo Fine Arts Academy, 36 N.Y.S.2d 49, 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
144 Id. A similar case involved the Providence Athenaeum, whose board had voted to deaccession 
its star holding, the Double Elephant Folio of Audubon’s Birds of America. (Though the 
Athenaeum is a library and not an art museum, the deaccession analysis is similar to those 
applied to art museums.) Throughout the 1990s, the Athenaeum ran into financial trouble and 
was forced to invade its endowment to pay for operating costs. Adams v. Providence Athenaeum, 
2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 151, at *14 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2004), aff’d Adams v. Christie’s, 0 A.2d 
774 (R.I. 2005). Demand on expenditures increased only after the library realised its building 
was falling apart – the floor had begun to sag – and rendering the entire structure hazardous. Id. 
at *15. After considering alternatives such as cutting staff and services, embarking on a capital 
campaign, raising membership dues and selling the building, the board decided to deaccession 
the Audubon folio. Id. Shareholders brought suit; on appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
applied the business judgment rule and held that the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence to 
rebut the business judgment rule’s presumptions. Id. at *25-2.
14 See White, above, note 9, at p. 1054 (contending that trust principles should be used in evaluating 
museum deaccessions); Gerstenblith, above, note 10, at p. 176 (arguing that regardless of the 
legal status of the museum, its board should be charged with trust duties); see also Lee, above, 
note 10, at p. 944 (advocating ordinary negligence review for non-profit corporate directors). 
But see Fremont-Smith, above, note 130, at 210 (observing that trust-standard advocates 
appear to be in the minority and that “most commentators argue that application of the business 
judgment rule to the decisions of nonprofit directors is justified.”).
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provide to the public. Whether a museum is organized as a trust 
or as a corporation, the public requires it to protect and preserve 
cultural assets.14 
Moreover, museums, regardless of their legal status, are usually supported by art 
and monetary donations from the public and these donations are considered trust 
assets,147 so board members ought to be held to the trust standard of care.14
Second, the trust standard compensates for insufficient monitoring of the 
non-profit’s management.149 The non-profit corporation’s beneficiaries – the 
public – have no standing to sue because they do not suffer particularised or 
unique injuries. Enforcement of the board’s legal duty is instead left to the 
discretion of the state Attorney General. But the Attorney General has finite 
resources with which he must prosecute all the state’s crimes, and monitoring 
museum directors for breach of fiduciary duty is hardly a priority.10 Moreover, 
short of egregious misconduct on the board’s part, the business judgment 
rule’s deference to the board makes it nearly impossible for attorneys general 
to prevail in court and thus discourages prosecution. Monitoring outside the 
litigation context is practically nonexistent: there are no voting shareholders 
to discipline boards for inefficiency or incompetence.11 And unlike for-profit 
corporations, a non-profit museum’s services do not have a ready market 
value, a proxy for an organisation’s performance. Consequently, its board’s 
performance cannot be assessed easily.152 Under these circumstances, the 
permissive corporate standard frees directors from much accountability and 
necessitates adoption of the trust standard as an extra check on directors.13 
Finally, the argument goes, the business judgment rule, created to serve unique 
needs of for-profit corporations, is inappropriate in the non-profit context. 
One rationale for the business judgment rule is that exposing directors to 
ordinary-negligence liability discourages risk-taking. But because for-profit 
corporations seek to maximise their profits, risk-taking is desirable; courts, 
14 White, above, note 9, at pp. 1054-55.      
147 Id. at p. 1056.
14 Id.; Gerstenblith, above  note 10, at pp. 176-77. Indeed, some museums, though incorporated 
as non-profits, legally hold objects in trust. See Rowan v. Pasadena Art Museum, No. C32217 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept 22, 191), reprinted in Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, above, note 1, 122 
at p. 125 (“The works of art belonging in [the museum], the museum building itself, and the 
land which it occupies are trust property; they are the assets of defendant corporation acting as 
trustee.”). However, the Rowan court still applied the corporate standard to evaluate the board’s 
interpretation that the corporate purpose permitted deaccessions, adding that the public will be 
protected “by the duty of the directors . . . to act in good faith and after reasonable inquiry.” Id.
149 White, above, note 9, at p. 1055; see also Fremont-Smith, above, note 130, at p. 233 (summarising                 
arguments for applying the trust standard of care to the decisions of non-profit directors).
10 Lee above, note 10, at p. 933 and note 49.          
11 Id. at 95.
152 See id. at pp. 957-5 (discussing the self-enforcing market mechanisms that regulate the conduct 
of corporate directors and which are found wanting in the non-profit context).
13 Id. at p. 95.
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which have little competence in business matters, should defer to business 
decisions made by the board (especially since investors can always exit by 
selling their shares).14 Non-profit corporations, in contrast, are not in the 
business to maximise profits and therefore risk-taking is not a particularly 
desirable activity.1 Indeed, non-profits should be cautious because they depend 
on the vagaries of donors for financial support. As such, it is inappropriate to 
apply the business judgment rule to non-profit corporate directors.1
IV. ApplyInG the truSt StAndArd of CAre And reCoGnISInG ItS lImItS
In light of the critical differences between non-profit and for-profit corporations, 
the conduct of museum board directors should be evaluated under the trust 
standard. That the business judgment rule usually works in conjunction with 
monitoring mechanisms absent in the non-profit setting justifies adopting the 
more exacting trust standard. Yet there are limits to what the trust standard 
can accomplish in deaccession controversies. Although the trust standard 
imposes higher procedural hurdles than the corporate standard, once these 
procedures are satisfied, the substance of the decision is insulated against 
challenge. This section applies the trust standard to previously unavailable 
deaccession policies of some prominent American art museums and in so 
doing, maps the limits of the trust standard.
The problem with the trust standard is that it is not a demanding rule – it 
appears demanding only when juxtaposed with the even more permissive 
corporate standard. Trustees need to do only what the prudent man in like 
circumstances would have done to fulfil his fiduciary duty. Prudence is 
determined by procedural adequacy. So long as the trustee performs certain 
tasks such as making reasonable inquiries and following internal procedures, 
he satisfies the prudence requirement.157 To be sure, a small component of the 
trust standard is substantive: trustees have the duty to maintain the safety of 
the trust property and to make it productive.1 In the overall analysis, however, 
the substantive component has little purchase if the procedural requirements 
are met. In Attorney General v. Olson,159 the defendants were trustees of some 
real estate and du Pont stocks; these assets were to be used to establish a 
museum.10 The trustees, who had little investment experience, consulted 
a bank and decided to diversify the investment. Unfortunately, sale of the 
du Pont stock resulted in a $17,000 loss, which the trial judge found would 
14 Id. at p. 946.
1 Id. at pp. 946-47.
1 Id.
157 See discussion below, Part III.A.    
1 Bogert, above note 94, at § 611;        First Alabama Bank of Montgomery v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 
427 (Ala. 192).
159 346 Mass. 190 (Mass.1963).   
10 Id. at 192-93.
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have been worth $700,000 more had the trustees not sold the stock.11 On 
appeal, the court held the trustees did not breach their fiduciary duty because 
they had properly consulted experts and had acted cautiously by diversifying; 
the fact that their action resulted in loss to the trust property was irrelevant.162 
Thus, so long as a trustee successfully completes the procedural checklist, the 
merits of the final decision will avoid scrutiny. As one court remarked:
Trustees are bound in the management of all the matters of the trust to 
act in good faith and employ such vigilance, sagacity, diligence and 
prudence as in general prudent men of discretion and intelligence 
in like matters employ . . . The law does not hold a trustee, acting in 
accord with such rule, responsible for errors in judgment.13
Under the trust standard of care, most art deaccessions would be found 
satisfactory. Museums establish detailed deaccession procedures requiring 
their boards to investigate, seek advice, and exercise care before voting on 
a deaccession – precisely the procedures required by the trust standard. Art 
museums, pursuant to AAMD’s ethics code, do not permit board members to 
contemplate deaccession unless and until a curator proposes deaccessions; the 
proposal must almost always be first approved by the museum’s professional 
staff – the Director and other curators – before it can be considered by the 
board.14 Prior to voting, board members must listen to curators explain why 
11 Id. at 19.
162 Id. In contrast, if trustees fail to satisfy the procedural steps, they are likely to breach their duty 
of care. There is some evidence that failure to follow internal standards alone is insufficient 
for liability; rather, the question is whether the trustee acted prudently. First Alabama Bank, 
425 So. 2d at 426-27. One rather egregious example is Estate of Collins, 72 Cal. App. 3d 663 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977). There, the trustees breached their fiduciary duty by failing to exercise 
caution and diversify mortgage investments, failing to obtain an appraisal for the land parcel in 
question, and failing to investigate the financial status of the sellers. Id. at 649. 
13 Costello v. Costello, 103 N.E. 14, 152 (N.Y. 1913).
14 See, e.g ., Metro. Museum of Art, Procedures for Deaccessioning and Disposal of Works of 
Art (Feb. 2005) [hereinafter Met Deaccession Procedures] (specifying that curators must 
recommend the deaccession to initiate the process); Indianapolis Museum of Art, �Deaccession 
Policy’ (Feb. 200), available at <http://www.imamuseum.org/explore/deaccessions> [hereinafter 
�Indianapolis Deaccession Policy’] (“The curator will present the deaccession proposal to the 
Director for approval prior to beginning the formal procedures.”); Los Angeles County Museum 
of Art, Collections Management Policy (on file with author) [hereinafter LACMA Collections 
Policy] (encouraging all curators in the relevant department to review the proposal, after which the 
Director and two-thirds of the curatorial department must concur before the proposed deaccession 
may be placed on the acquisition committee’s agenda); MOMA Deaccession Procedures, above, 
note 62, at p. 127 (“The Staff Acquisition Committee proposes deaccessioning to the Painting 
and Sculpture Committee simultaneously with the presentation of the work which it hopes to 
acquire by exchange or sale.”); PMA Deaccession Policy, above, note 62 (providing that the 
deaccession procedure begins with a curator identifying a potential object for deaccession and 
requiring the curator’s proposal for deaccession to be approved by the Director, the curators, 
and the curatorial advisory committee before the Committee on Collections can consider the 
deaccession); see also AAMD Professional Practices, above, note 26, at p. 15 (“The process of 
deaccessioning and disposal must be initiated by the appropriate professional staff”); College Art 
Ass’n of America, �Resolution Concerning the Sale and Exchange of Works of Art by Museums’, 
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the object should be deaccessioned.1 At Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts, 
objects proposed for deaccession must be brought to the board meeting or 
otherwise be on hand for inspection.1 Independent appraisal reports must 
be presented to the board.167 Many museum deaccession procedures mandate 
outside consultation and even approval.1  The Baltimore Museum of Art 
compels board members to consider the anti-deaccession view by requiring 
every deaccession proposal to include any dissenting opinions by the 
museum’s curators and all such dissents “must be presented prominently 
at each sequential stage of the deaccession process, including presentation 
to the Director, to the applicable Accessions Committee, to the Executive 
Committee, and to the Board.”169 The BMA also requires two-thirds majority 
votes each from the Accessions Committee, the Executive Committee, and the 
full board before an object can be deaccessioned.170 Deaccession procedures 
force board members to exercise caution by, as MOMA does, requiring the 
acquisition committee’s unanimous consent rather than majority vote.171 
Museums may provide additional voting for particularly valuable objects. At 
the Metropolitan, the acquisition committee’s vote to deaccession an object 
reprinted in Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, above, note 1, at p. 120 (“Trustees must, however, 
invest the professional staff with the primary responsibility for developing the judgments involved 
in the disposal of a specific work of art.”).
1 See, e.g ., Met Deaccession Procedures, above, note 164 (requiring curators to present their 
recommendations to the acquisition committee, including the curator’s evaluation of the work); 
LACMA Collections Policy, above, note 164 (requiring the Director’s signed recommendation 
for the deaccession and written curatorial justifications must be submitted to the acquisition 
committee at least one week before the committee meeting); PMA Deaccession Policy, above, 
note 62  (requiring the curator recommending the deaccession to prepare a written statement 
explaining why the object should be deaccessioned).
1 MFA Boston Collection Policy, above, note 62. The Los Angeles County Museum of Art              
similarly provides that objects proposed for deaccession must be available for viewing by 
acquisition committee members at least one week before the committee meets to discuss the 
proposed deaccession. LACMA Collections Policy, above, note 164.
167 Art Institute of Chicago Deaccession Policy, above, note 62 (requiring every object proposed             
for deaccession to receive outside appraisal); Indianapolis Deaccession Policy, above, note 164 
(“The Museum will seek a written opinion of the recommendation to deaccession from an 
outside expert for significant objects. Evaluations based on photographs will not be accepted 
for the purposes of deaccession.”); LACMA Collections Policy, above  note 14 (two outside 
appraisals for proposed deaccessions valued at $10,000 or more); PMA Deaccession Policy, 
above, note 62 (mandating at least one appraisals from independent outside experts if the value 
of the object under consideration is less than $50,000 and at least two such appraisals if the 
value is $50,000 or more).
1 Examples of art museums requiring outside consultation include the Art Institute of Chicago             
and the St. Louis Art Museum. Art Institute of Chicago Deaccession Policy, above  note 62 
(requiring at least one outside expert’s written recommendation supporting the deaccession for 
every object appraised at more than $5,000); Bonnetti, above, note 30.
169 Baltimore Museum ofArt, Deaccession Overview, Policy & Procedures (Mar. 2001) (confidential            
and unpublished material; on file with author). The BMA’s policy is revised periodically and 
this is the most recent version.
170 Id.
171 MOMA Deaccession Procedures, above, note 62, at 1277; see also LACMA Collections Policy,             
above, note 164 (“Because of its complex legal and ethical nature, the deaccession process 
requires even greater deliberation than the acquisition of objects”).
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worth more than $50,000 is merely a recommendation; either the entire board 
or its executive committee must approve the deaccession before it becomes 
final.172 Like the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, some museums’ policies 
recommend waiting periods before the committee votes.173 The Albright-
Knox’s deaccession vote came only after a three-and-a-half year process that 
included consultation with scholars and museum professionals.174 These steps 
satisfy the trust requirements of investigation, advice-seeking, and exercise 
of care, caution and diligence. Thus, given current museum deaccession 
procedures, so long as museum boards adhere to their museum’s procedures, 
few would run foul of the trust standard of care. 
Beyond procedural safeguards, however, the trust standard provides no analytic 
framework for evaluating deaccessions on the merits. Once the procedural 
steps are satisfied, the trust standard is indifferent to the choice between, say, 
deaccessioning some excellent post-Impressionist works versus passing on 
an important Velasquez, or the choice between selling a collection of Old 
Masters to buy better contemporary art versus maintaining the collection 
and forgoing some acquisitions. Courts, standing in the shoes of a prudent 
man exercising care and skill and diligence, cannot answer these questions 
because these choices, having survived the museum’s mandatory procedures, 
fall within the range of actions a prudent man would undertake. After courts 
are satisfied a fiduciary has properly and prudently exercised care in arriving 
at his decision, they refrain from evaluating its merits.175  The trust standard, 
in short, ensures that one is more informed about one’s options, but not which 
option one ought to choose.
But suppose courts wished to attack the substance of a deaccession decision. If 
so, the basic substantive components of prudence – that trustees must ensure 
the safety and productivity of the trust asset – in fact work against courts. To 
determine what prudence entails, courts cannot evaluate a decision in isolation 
but instead must look at collection management as a whole.176 Deaccession, 
172 Met Deaccession Procedures, above, note 164. At LACMA, proposed deaccessions of works            
worth $500 or more require the executive committee’s approval, and works worth $100,000 or 
more require approval of the entire board. LACMA Collections Policy, above, note 164. The 
Philadelphia Museum of Art permits the Committee on Collections to approve deaccessions of 
objects valued at less than $50,000 but requires the full board’s approval to deaccession objects 
valued at $50,000 or more. PMA Deaccession Policy, above, note 62.
173 See LACMA Collections Policy, above, note 164 (recommending a three-month waiting 
period between the Director’s decision to place the deaccession proposal on the acquisition 
committee’s agenda and the committee action). MOMA similarly requires the Painting and 
Sculpture Committee to consider the proposed deaccession on two separate occasions before 
the matter can be brought to the Board of Trustees for final approval. MOMA Deaccession 
Procedures, above, note 62, at 1277.
174 Huntington, above, note 36.   
175 See above text accompanying notes 157-163.     
176 See Chase v. Pevear, 33 Mass. 350, 364 (Mass. 191) (“in deciding what is prudent, the cases 
�warrant some regard being had to the administration of the fund as a whole’”).
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after all, is simply a tool with which museums manage their collections.177 
Museum boards – as trustees or as directors – have fiduciary obligations to the 
entire collection, not just to the painting to be deaccessioned.17 They must act 
as prudent men would in their stewardship of the collection. Board members 
should ensure the safety of trust property by making sure the museum stays 
solvent and able to pay for maintenance and conservation; they should ensure 
the collection’s integrity and continuing relevance by refining its holdings and 
avoiding clutter.179  What is substantively prudent in a particular deaccession 
is measured against the collection’s overall needs. When, under the trust 
standard, museums cannot afford to pay for basic operating costs to safeguard 
the collection, or when museums are on the brink of financial collapse, or 
even when museums have the rare opportunity to purchase a masterpiece, 
prudence would likely advise a deaccession.10
V. beyond leGAl ruleS: SubStAntIVe lImItS on deACCeSSIonS
Judicial restraint in reviewing art deaccessions does not shield the merits of 
the deaccession from all scrutiny. The trust standard limits court review to 
procedural adequacy. Non-legal restraints such as professional ethics, self 
regulation, and public opinion complement law’s procedural restraints by 
imposing substantive limits on art deaccessions.
Professional ethics codes set forth substantive standards of conduct that 
impose higher standards than those required by the law.11 The trust standard 
permits museums to deaccession to replenish operating budgets – prudent men 
may think it judicious to sell a work of art when the budget runs low; indeed, 
this is hardly a hypothetical outcome given it is how numerous works of art 
end up at auction in the first place. In contrast, the AAM and AAMD forbid 
deaccessioning for this purpose. Should a member museum violate this rule, 
professional censure swiftly follows and can impose costly consequences on 
the museum. Both the Fogg Museum and the Phillips Collection changed their 
deaccession plans after AAMD objected. The National Academy Museum 
presents a more sobering example. After the museum deaccessioned some 
paintings and used the proceeds to pay for operating expenses, the AAMD 
publicly censured the museum, calling on its members to “suspend any loans 
of works of art to and any collaborations on exhibitions with the National 
177 See discussion above Part II.    
17 See Boyd, above, note 52, at p. 356.
179 Lauren McBrayer and John J. Steele, �The Art of Deaccession: An Ethical Perspective’,             Legal 
Probs. Museum Admin 34 (ALI-ABA 2005) (“museum professionals are �caught in a tug-of-
war between the clear fiduciary duty to maintain the museum’s solvency and their murky legal 
and ethical obligations to the public not to treat works of art as fungible objects”).
10 Cf. White, above, note 9 (arguing that courts should approve use of deaccession proceeds for 
operations if the board satisfies the trust standard).
11 Malaro, �Museum Governance’, above, note 59, at p. 17 (“The law, as a rule, sets a lower                 
standard than that required by ethical codes”).
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Academy.”12 As museums depend on loans and exhibitions to attract visitors, 
the National Academy’s Director described AAMD’s call for a loan embargo 
as “a death knell” for her museum.13
But, one may object, it is all very well to complain and censure museums 
after the fact; the more pertinent inquiry is whether non-legal rules have any 
prophylactic effect in deterring museums from cannibalising their collections. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests they do. Here it is instructive to compare the role 
of non-legal, professional rules in deaccessions at stand-alone art museums 
with those at university art museums. Because many university art museums 
are not AAMD or AAM members,14 and because university boards are 
fiduciaries of the entire university, the museum profession’s ethical rules are of 
little consequence when a university board considers its fundraising options. 
Whereas stand-alone art museums’ deaccessions in recent memory (with the 
exception of the National Academy) were made to pay for acquisitions, recent 
university art museum deaccessions were all made to raise money for the 
university’s endowment or operating costs.1 Though no causal inference 
follows from this observation, it is nevertheless indicative that AAM and 
AAMD museums take the ethical guidelines seriously.
To be sure, even for stand-alone museums, ethical standards are not legally 
binding and their effectiveness depends on self-education, self-motivation 
and peer pressure.1 Enforcement of ethical standards “cannot be effective 
without a consistent and voluntary commitment from a sizable portion of the 
profession.”17 The museum profession, notwithstanding occasional lapses, 
possesses the necessary commitment, one rooted in museums’ institutional 
identity. Museums are, at heart, custodians of their collections and are supposed 
to hold their collections in trust for perpetuity.1 As such, it is a “fundamental 
professional principle” that objects from the collection can be deaccessioned 
only to fund acquisitions and improve the collection.19 Trading in the 
12 AAMD Press Release on National Academy, above, note 50. The National Academy withdrew             
from AAMD after noting the association of its decision to use the proceeds for operating 
expenses. Id. Since then, the National Academy has met with the AAMD to revise its governance 
practices, including greater fiscal oversight and institution of a long-term fundraising program. 
Press Release, �Ass’n of Art Museum Directors, Joint Statement of the Association of Art 
Museum Directors and the National Academy’ (Mar. 11, 2009), available at <http://www.aamd.
org/newsroom/documents/JointStatementAAMDNationalAcademy3-11-09.pdf>.
13 Finkel, above, note 46. For more on loans, see below, text accompanying notes 193-196.             
14 See  Sonia von Gutfeld, �Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Panelists Debate Museum Deaccessioning’, 
<http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/200/march200/deaccession_
rev> (last visited 21 Feb. 2009). 
1 See above, note 47.
1 Malaro, �Museum Governance’, above, note 59, at p. 17.        
17 Id.
1 Ledbetter Interview, above, note 49.    
19 AAMD Press Release on National Academy, above, note 50 (explaining that museums            
“collect works of art for the benefit of present and future generations”); see also Press Release, 
Ass’n of Art Museum Directors, �Statement Concerning Randolph College and the Maier 
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collection to save the custodian endangers museums’ fundamental identity, 
making museums art and antiques dealers rather than cultural custodians.190 
Museum professionals, particularly curators who initiate the deaccession 
process, tend to be “invested in the idea of art’s intrinsic value” and better 
able to resist the urge to cannibalise the art collection.191 Further conducive to 
enforcement efforts is the size of the professional community. The art museum 
profession is a relatively small world; Directors and curators tend to know 
each other – from school, conferences, collaboration on exhibitions – and 
peer disapproval of improper deaccessions is felt more keenly.192
A related concern is the fear that the checks and balances of the board-
Director relationship may fail. Possibly the Director (and curators) will 
succumb to the board’s view that the collection is just another asset to be sold 
when funds run low, or the board may be unduly persuaded by a charismatic 
Director’s proposal to deaccession. But to accept this argument is to ignore the 
synergistic values of legal and non-legal rules. Directors, who must approve 
deaccession proposals before the board can consider them, are vulnerable to 
professional criticism. They are AAMD members and thus directly governed 
by the association and its ethics rules. Should they propose or approve of a 
deaccession contrary to AAMD’s ethics code, professional stigma may impede 
the Director’s career prospects. More significantly, professional reputation, 
coupled with the rule that Directors approve deaccession proposals before 
boards can even consider them, allow non-legal protections to safeguard the 
initiation of deaccessions, well before fiduciary law is triggered. And should 
Directors flout non-legal rules and propose unethical deaccessions, the 
board’s consideration is informed by fiduciary law. Though boards may find 
themselves persuaded by the Director’s charisma, the trust standard provides 
procedural safeguards that ensure deliberation – that is, time to reflect on the 
decision in a clear, cool-headed way.
Though not legally enforceable, ethical standards and professional 
condemnation nevertheless bear legal significance. This is especially salient 
when museum loans each other artworks because the board’s fiduciary duties 
apply not only to deaccessions but to all aspects of collection management, 
Museum of Art’ (3 Oct. 2007), available at <http://www.aamd.org/newsroom/documents/
MaierMuseumStatement_October2007.pdf>.
190 Ledbetter Interview, above, note 49.     
191 Finkel, above, note 46. Sociologists characterise communities of professionals, such as curators,            
as having a shared sense of identity and values. See William J. Goode, �Community Within a 
Community: The Professions’, 22 Am. Soc. Rev. 194 at p. 194 (1957). Further, a professional 
community maintains its norms and identity by putting “its recruits through a set of adult 
socialization processes and maintain[ing] procedures for continuing social controls over the 
practicing professional.” Id. at p. 196.  
192 Telephone Interview with Kim Rorschach, Director, Nasher Museum of Art at Duke University,             
in Durham, N.C. (10 Nov. 200). 
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including loans.193 Prudence advises that when making outgoing loans, 
lending museums must reasonably ensure that loan objects receive adequate 
care at the borrowing institution.194 If, however, the borrowing institution has 
been publicly censured by a professional association for poor management 
practices (such as improper use of deaccession proceeds), then it becomes 
much harder for the lending museum to show it acted prudently in making 
the loan. For instance, the AAM’s rescission of the Museum of Northern 
Arizona’s accreditation indicates that that museum’s management no longer 
merits the profession’s seal of approval, while the AAMD’s request that its 
members suspend all loans to or exhibitions with the National Academy 
signals the profession’s distrust of the museum’s management priorities. 
Professional condemnation, in other words, measures prudence. Of course, 
given the importance of loan reciprocity, 195 one wonders whether a museum 
can afford to refuse loans if the offending museum is one like MOMA or the 
Metropolitan that holds prominent collections from which the first museum 
hopes to borrow. And the clubbiness of a small professional community may 
make it difficult to turn down loan requests from one’s former professor or 
good friend. But as a legal matter of fiduciary duty, museum boards must 
take professional condemnation seriously when contemplating loans to other 
museums. This consideration gives the ethical component of deaccessions its 
legal edge.196 
Museums also have built-in incentives to retain their art. The reputation 
that one is a deaccession cookie-jar raider197 scares away potential donors. 
Art museums that ransack their collections to raise money will soon find 
themselves without the very objects that define their existence. And without 
193 Final authority to approve loans typically belongs to the board. See, e.g           ., LACMA Bylaws, 
above, note 69, at Art. IV, § 14(b) (investing in the acquisitions committee the power to approve 
major loans as defined by a minimum monetary value); Met Collections Policy, above, note 
7 (requiring board approval of all loans above a certain value); see also Malaro, A Legal 
Primer, above, note 12, at p. 261 (explaining that the authority to make loans rests in the 
museum’s board and that the board must retain oversight of outgoing loans when it delegates 
such authority to the museum’s professional staff). Statistics on number of loans are hard to 
come by. But at the Philadelphia Museum of Art’s 2009 �Cezanne and Beyond’ show, fewer 
than twenty works on exhibition were from the PMA’s own collection and everything else was 
loaned from other museums or private collectors.
194 See id. at p. 262 (“If a museum has a history of poor experience with a borrower, prudence 
would dictate a stringent review before any new loans are negotiated.”).
195 AAMD guidelines recognise that “[m]useums rely on one another for loans to exhibitions”              
and consequently, “a spirit of cooperation and collegiality that recognizes this interdependence 
should inform all decisions relative to such loans . . . .” AAMD Professional Practices, above, 
note 26, at p. 6.
196 But this impact is somewhat limited to art museums, which depend greatly on loans. Ledbetter               
Interview, above, note 49. For institutions that rely less on loans (such as history museums), the 
legal bite of ethics codes is less evident. Id.
197 This term was coined by Stephen Weil, former deputy director of the Hirshhorn Museum and               
Sculpture Garden and a prolific commentator on art deaccessions. See Stephen E. Weil, �The 
Deaccession Cookie Jar’, in A Deaccession Reader, above, note 4, at p. 91.
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artwork on its walls, a museum would find it harder to attract visitors and 
donations. Moreover, art museums compete with other non-profit organisations 
for outside funding, and they will not succeed if they are perceived to be 
capable of financial self-help: if a museum can raise money simply by selling 
a few paintings, a donor may prefer to give to another organisation unable to 
support itself.19 “[T]he use of deaccessioning proceeds to meet a museum’s 
operating expenses” – and even other expenses such as acquisition – “would 
appear to be an inherently self-defeating strategy.”199 Thus art museums’ self-
interest in attracting and keeping donors counsels against selling from the 
collection and, at the very least, encourages careful study of the costs and 
benefits of deaccessioning.
Even when economic crises hit, driving down donations and corporate 
sponsorship, temptation to cash in the artwork to fund operations is tempered 
by two practical considerations. First, in hard times, art prices collapse, making 
deaccession a less attractive option. During the current economic meltdown, 
the contemporary art sales at Christie’s and Sotheby’s consistently either 
brought lower-than-expected prices or the artwork failed to sell altogether.200 
Second, museums are forced to rely more on their own permanent collections 
when money becomes tight. Since the 1970s, art museums have relied on 
blockbuster exhibitions to bring in more visitors and more money.201 In good 
times, such exhibitions can count on generous corporate sponsorship and 
loans from other museums. But in bad times, art museums are obliged to look 
more to themselves to put on the exhibitions to bring in the cash. When the 
cost of terrorism insurance increased in the aftermath of September 11, art 
19 Id. at p. 9.
199 Id. at p. 91; see also Robert R. Macdonald, �Collections, Cash Cows, and Ethics’, Museum 
News, Jan./Feb. 1995, at p. 43 (“Who will donate to artistic . . . materials to museums . . . 
that view their collections as ready resources of available cash to be used for the institution’s 
operations?”). One recent illustration is Brandeis University, whose decision to sell the Rose 
Art Museum’s entire collection to make up for endowment losses upset former donors. One, 
who gave both cash and artwork, said the school’s decision “makes me feel disposable, like a 
plastic fork.” Grant, above, note 43. “What Brandeis did certainly doesn’t encourage being a 
donor”, observed the son of a pair of Rose donors. Id.
200 See, e.g ., Carol Vogel, �Mixed Results for Contemporary Art Sale at Christie’s’, N.Y.Times, 
12 Nov.200, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/200/11/13/arts/design/13auction.
html> (reporting that the sale had been estimated at $227 million but brought in only $113.6 
million, and that almost one-third of the works failed to sell); Carol Vogel, �A Dreary Night for 
Contemporary Art at Sotheby’s’, N.Y.Times, 11 Nov. 200, available at <http://www.nytimes.
com/200/11/12/arts/design/12auction.html> (reporting that the auction, estimated to bring in 
$202.4 million, resulted in only $125.1 million and that 20 of the 63 lots offered did not sell). 
A lacklustre art market limits museums’ disposal options. Brandeis University, on the market 
to sell over 7,000 objects, faces unenviable choices. Observers agreed the school should not 
immediately auction the artwork, both because of the slumping art market and because placing 
most of the objects in the market increases supply and decreases price. Grant, above, note 43. 
Private sales are even less attractive because they may invite lawsuits claiming the school 
forwent the possibility of obtaining higher prices at auction. Id.
201 Andrew McClellan,  The Art Museum from Boullée to Bilbao p. 13 (200).
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museums, facing a drop in loans, put on creative exhibitions that drew from 
their permanent collections.202 Although falling art prices and greater self-
reliance cannot wholly counteract the temptation to sell from the collection, 
they do diminish incentives for reckless and unethical deaccessions.
Finally, the court of public opinion checks the discretion of board members 
and art museums. Public outrage following the de Groot deaccession drove 
the Metropolitan to agree to notify the state attorney general of all major 
deaccessions. The museum also agreed that all subsequent deaccessioned 
works would be disposed of by public auction.203 In general, if an art museum 
wishes to sell an object for money, it will use the art market – probably 
auction204 – where the deaccession will be scrutinised by the media and 
the public.205 As art museums have become increasingly aware that their 
legitimacy depends on public confidence,206 the spectre of public disapproval 
encourages museums to practise self-restraint and caution in deaccessions. 
MOMA’s Director explains that to retain the public’s confidence: “museums 
must be perceived to be acting both responsibly and for the common good . 
. .  that art museums – at a minimum – inspire confidence in the public that 
they have made considered judgments” about the contents of the collection.207 
Consequently, museums may be more reluctant to deaccession for fear of a 
public backlash that undermines their own legitimacy.
VI. A normAtIVe ASSeSSment of the truSt StAndArd of CAre
The conclusion that even the heightened trust standard cannot prevent or undo 
deaccessions is distressing to those who believe that museums should not 
treat artwork as widgets to be cashed in whenever acquisition or operations 
funds run low. Deaccessioning, for many, is “unpalatable . . . as it involves 
contemplating each work of art in a museum collection as a fungible asset” – a 
conception antithetical to the belief that art has an intrinsic value independent 
202 Carol Vogel, �Museums Fear Lean Days Ahead’,       N.Y. Times, 19 Oct. 200, available at <http://
www.nytimes.com/200/10/20/arts/design/20muse.html>. Art museums felt the 200 recession 
keenly, because failed investment banks such as Lehman Brothers had been stalwart supporters 
of exhibitions, and because museums’ endowment funds, which pay for operating expenses, 
plummeted with the market. Id.
203 Hoving, Making the Mummies Dance, above, note 3, at p. 306.
204 As one art dealer observed, going to auction avoids legal difficulties for fiduciaries because it               
“shows people, �See, we got the highest price possible,’ even if the top bid is lower than what 
someone else might have paid privately. Auctions are transparent, and no one can question it.” 
Grant, above, note 43. 
205 Ledbetter �Interview’, above, note 49; see also Grant, above, note 43 (quoting the Director of                
the Indianapolis Museum of Art, who explained his museum prefers auctions to private sales 
because it “puts the act of deaccessioning in the public eye. The public trust issue is more 
important than the small gain that might be made in selling another way.”).
206 The public’s diminishing confidence in museums has prompted Directors of several prominent            
art museums to examine the public purpose and authority of museums. Their essays are collected 
in Whose Muse? Art Museums and the Public Trust, above, note 14.
207 Lowry, above, note 23, at p. 143.      
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of its market worth.20 Moreover, museums give the public an opportunity to 
view works of art in person – to experience their power firsthand and leave 
“�at a different angle’ to that in which we came, changed somewhat from who 
we were, or thought we were, before we experienced them.”209 
While these sentiments are admirable, fiduciary law does not provide the means 
to achieve them. There are inherent limits to a trustee’s fiduciary obligation: the 
law focuses on the care and diligence with which the decision was made, not the 
merit of the decision itself. Yet this limitation is precisely why the trust standard 
of care should be the standard for board members of non-profit corporate 
museums. Just as museum boards should be held to higher standards in the 
absence of shareholder monitoring, so too must they have discretion to manage 
the collections in their charge. By levying more exacting procedural requirements 
while preventing courts from second-guessing decisions on their merits, the 
trust standard strikes the right balance between holding boards accountable and 
protecting their discretion. Moreover, that courts do not evaluate the merits of 
deaccessions does not mean boards are free to do what they please – non-legal 
restraints from the professional community and the public complement legal 
rules by imposing substantive limits on deaccessions. 
Compared with corporate law, the trust standard is the better rule because it 
ensures sound procedures for deaccession decisions. Museums, unlike for-
profit corporations, lack shareholders to vote for directors or bring derivative 
lawsuits; consequently, museums and their boards are subject to considerably 
less monitoring even as they manage millions of dollars of artwork. In the 
absence of external monitoring, the law should encourage non-profit boards 
to exercise more care than that demanded by the corporate standard. The trust 
standard ensures additional care by specifying what it takes to be informed rather 
than leaving the board to decide how to become reasonably informed. The trust 
standard further reconfigures the incentive structure by first, directly imposing 
liability for breach of care rather than merely removing the presumption of 
propriety and second, limiting the fiduciary’s immunity. By making it harder for 
boards to escape personal liability210 and thus forcing them to internalise some of 
the costs of breaching their duties of care, the trust standard encourages boards 
to act with scrupulous care. Additionally, from an enforcement perspective, the 
trust standard’s clarity and procedural focus makes it easier for attorneys general 
to prosecute boards for fiduciary breaches – instead of deference under the 
20 White, above, note 9, at p. 1042. Further rankling anti-deaccessionists is the recent spate of               
deaccessions: in the space of just five years, the Los Angeles County Museum of Act sold 42 
Impressionist and modern works from its permanent collection; MOMA sold a cubist Picasso; 
and the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston sold two important pastels by Degas. Rosenbaum, 
above, note 34.
209 James Cuno, �The Object of Art Museums’, in        Whose Muse? Art Museums and the Public 
Trust, above, note 14, at p. 54.
210 See above, Part III.   
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business judgment rule, the new review standard asks whether boards satisfied 
the trust standard’s procedural checklist before deaccessioning an artwork, a 
more manageable burden of proof.
The trust standard, however, rightly prevents courts (and Attorneys General) 
from second-guessing deaccessions on substantive grounds and meddling 
in museum management.211 Deaccession is not a stand-alone museum 
practice.212 It is part of a carefully calibrated system in which interference 
with one element necessarily disrupts the balance of the whole. In collections 
management, deaccession is a necessary culling tool that compensates for 
the liberal and unwise acquisitions practised by American art museums even 
today.213 Limiting deaccessions would therefore present art museums with the 
following choices: continue to acquire freely but be burdened by artworks 
that cannot be disposed of, or change the acquisition policy. Either outcome 
represents a serious interference with museum autonomy. If courts may veto 
deaccessions, they are effectively given a voice in overall collection policy 
and management. Yet most American museums are private institutions, each 
free to collect what it pleases and to choose which paintings will hang on its 
walls.214 As with the corporate world, autonomy and decentralised decision-
making by private actors are the hallmarks of American arts and culture. The 
American art museum is not a vehicle for the government’s cultural policy, 
and courts should not be allowed to interfere with museum management. 
Instead, institutional competence counsels that the task of second-guessing 
deaccessions is better left to the community of museum professionals and to the 
public. The scope of judicial review distils into two questions: who decides and 
what they decide. Courts are experts in matters of procedure and are competent 
to determine whether or not a board made decisions using adequate procedural 
safeguards. But courts are not experts in the administration of art museums, 
which “requires connoisseurship, discernment, and knowledge in dealing with 
works of art, as well as the judgment and experience necessary for the operation 
of a complex organization.”215 Competence in collecting and managing art 
belongs to museum professionals and the public. Unlike judges, whose expertise 
is in law and not art, professional associations such as the AAMD are uniquely 
qualified to evaluate deaccessions on the merits because they are experts in 
collection management and because they are responsible for maintaining the 
profession’s ethical integrity. Likewise, the public can question deaccessions 
because they are the beneficiaries whom museums serve. 
211 The trust standard also prevents Attorneys General from politicising deaccession prosecutions.           
If, for example, the attorney general thinks the museum ought not to have deaccessioned 
religious art to focus on conceptual art, the trust standard, which does not authorise review on 
deaccessions on their merits, stops Attorneys General from prosecuting the board.
212 See discussion above Part II.B.    
213 See Andrews above, note 16.    
214 See discussion above Part II.    
215 AAMD Professional Practices, above, note 26, at p. 4.        
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Non-legal rules are, of course, imperfect and fierce criticism from the 
profession and the public cannot deter or undo all deaccessions. Yet the 
alternative, having legal rules governing the substance of deaccessions, is 
even less attractive. Central to the rationale for adopting the trust standard is 
to ensure board members take proper care and be informed in their decisions. 
It is not to allow judges – who have repeatedly asserted their ignorance of art 
and inability to evaluate artistic merit216 – to decide on artistic and financial 
matters in which they have no experience. Disparate competence between 
courts and museum boards is especially acute considering that deaccession 
decisions are usually made by the board’s acquisition committees,217 whose 
members have extensive understanding of the museum’s collection precisely 
because they are responsible for acquiring some of it in the first place.21 
These committees also know something about art because they tend to be 
staffed by knowledgeable collectors in their own right.219 Of course, courts 
must sometimes make artistic judgments, but that intervention should be 
minimal.220 The same logic justifies the business judgment rule in corporate 
law:221 courts should not interfere with management decisions because of “the 
216 A typical court disclaimer of artistic knowledge and appreciation asserts: “We are not art              
critics, [and] do not pretend to be . . . .” Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 60, 610 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (applying the Visual Artists Rights Act). In an early copyright case establishing the 
doctrine of aesthetic non-discrimination, Justice Holmes wrote, “[i]t would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 1 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
217 An exception is the Metropolitan, where deaccessions for objects is worth more than $50,000              
must be voted on by the full board or the executive committee votes; but the acquisition 
committee does provide a recommendation for or against the deaccession. �Met Deaccession 
Procedures’, above, note 164.
21 At the Metropolitan, proposals for acquisitions had to explain how the object will complement              
the collection. See Hoving, �The Chase’, above, note 1, at pp. 7-10.
219 Among the members of the Metropolitan’s acquisition committee are prominent and           
experienced art collectors such as Leonore Annenberg (Impressionist and post-Impressionist 
art), Joseph Hotung (Chinese jade), Florence Irving (Asian art), Joyce Menschel (photography), 
Andrew Saul (modern and contemporary art), Shelby White (classical antiquities) and Jayne 
Wrightsman (French decorative arts). Met Annual Report 2007, above, note 40, at p. 2; see 
also above, note 2. Likewise, MOMA’s Painting and Sculpture Committee has “a number of 
collectors familiar with both quality and price of modern works, but also scholars in art history 
who are independent of [MOMA’s] staff and [board]”; moreover, MOMA’s board, whose 
approval is required for deaccessions, is composed of many art historians and museologists. 
MOMA Deaccession Procedures, above, note 2, at p. 127.
220 Copyright law is instructive on this point. Although courts require creativity as a condition              
precedent to finding subject-matter eligibility for copyright, “the requisite level of creativity 
is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Feist Publ’n Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). The low threshold is satisfied if, for example, the author 
exercises her judgment in the selection of data for a factual compilation. See, e.g., Key Publ’n, 
Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enter., 945 F. 2d 509 (2d Cir.1991).  Even though judges do 
look for creativity, the doctrine of aesthetic non-discrimination still applies and the finding of 
creativity is not an exercise of judging artistic merit.
221 See, e.g ., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 196) 
(observing that the business judgment rule recognizes “the limited institutional competence of 
courts to assess business decisions.”).
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judiciary’s lack of capacity to do so and to concerns about �hindsight bias’.”222 
The board, which knows the collection best, is best able to make artistic and 
financial decisions for the collection. If courts know little about art or finance, 
their intrusion can scarcely improve upon the board’s decision.
Here one may wonder: if the museum profession is competent in evaluating 
the deaccession’s merits, why not incorporate professional standards into the 
law? 223 Why not add to the trust standard a prohibition of all deaccessions to 
pay for operations?224 This proposal should be rejected for three reasons. First, 
incorporating professional ethics into the law is impracticable. Museums are 
not the only non-profit corporations, a category that encompasses organisations 
as diverse as hospitals, advocacy groups, professional associations and real-
estate organisations. To integrate each profession’s ethics into trust law would 
sacrifice advantages of a bright-line rule such as uniformity and administrative 
ease. Moreover, to stay current, the law must change every time the profession 
decides on a new norm. Second, this scheme cannot be enforced. Even if 
the judiciary were permitted to scrutinise the merits of deaccessions, unless 
standing is expanded to permit professional associations or the general public 
to bring suit against museum boards – a highly unlikely scenario225 – courts 
would have few opportunities to hear such cases.  Finally, borrowing from 
professional norms compromises the trust standard. Prudential considerations 
sometimes counsel fiduciaries to sell a few works of art to save the rest of the 
collection. In deliberating whether to deaccession to increase the operations 
budget, board members presumably weigh the harm of professional censure 
against the benefits of preserving the collection. The board’s decision represents 
its own judgment of how to manage a museum. But should the board be 
exposed to legal liability for such a deaccession, it will almost certainly refuse 
to sell. This decision is compelled by law and does not reflect the board’s own 
judgment. Moreover, such a rule prevents the board from properly discharging 
its fiduciary duty to the rest of the collection.226 It is an outcome that upsets 
222 Aaron D. Jones, �Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers             
under Delaware Law’, 44 Am. Bus. L.J. 475, 42 (2007).
223 A New York State Assemblyman, in collaboration with the state’s museum association, recently              
proposed a bill that would prohibit museums from using deaccession proceeds to pay for 
operating expenses. Leg. Bill Drafting Comm’n. 1060-01-9 (N.Y. 2009), available at <http://
graphics.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/arts/0312009-bill.pdf>; see also Robin Pogrebin, �Bill 
Seeks to Regulate Museums’ Art Sales’, N.Y. Times, 1 Mar. 2009, at C1. 
224 See Rosenbaum, above, note 34 (“Legislators and government regulators should hold           
museums to the often ignored standards for disposal spelled out in the published guidelines 
of the Association of Art Museum Directors: poor quality, redundancy, or problems with title, 
authenticity or condition.”).
225 See above, note 131.
226 For instance, New York’s proposed deaccession bill would require museums to make good-faith             
efforts to sell deaccessioned works to other museums. Leg. Bill Drafting Comm’n. 1060-01-9 
(N.Y. 2009), available at <http://graphics.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/arts/0312009-bill.pdf>. 
This would impede museums’ ability to obtain the best price by going to auction, as buyer-
museums usually cannot afford those prices. 
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the trust standard’s careful balance between accountability and discretion, and 
should be rejected. The better approach is to subject deaccession procedures 
to judicial scrutiny but leave the merit debate in the non-legal sphere. 
VII. ConCluSIon
The occasional deaccession of a favorite work of art creates fierce public 
backlash and prompts litigation against art museums and their boards. 
Lawsuits highlight an ongoing debate: whether directors of non-profit 
corporations should be held to the corporate standard of care, as current 
trends would indicate, or whether they should be held to the trust standard 
of care. Commentators advocate applying the more exacting trust standard 
to deaccessions. Insufficient monitoring in the non-profit setting warrants the 
creation of additional incentives for museum boards to exercise more care than 
is required by corporate law. The trust standard creates those incentives both 
by forcing board members to deliberate carefully before reaching a decision, 
and by restricting the scope of immunity. Thus, the trust standard should be 
the measure of non-profit directors’ conduct.
It is also important to recognise the inherent limits of the trust standard and 
of the law in deaccession cases. The trust standard focuses procedure rather 
than substance – so long as trustees satisfy specific procedures, it has little or 
nothing to say about whether a museum should keep a work of art. Instead, 
non-legal rules such as professional ethics and public opinion must judge the 
merits of the deaccession. Together, legal and non-legal rules complement 
each other by bringing both the procedure and merits of the deaccession 
under scrutiny of those best suited to evaluating each decision. The trust 
standard is not meant to deprive board members of discretion in collection 
management. To permit courts ill-equipped to make the artistic and financial 
choices at heart of deaccessions and meddle where they profess ignorance 
would do a disservice to the purpose of using the trust standard: requiring that 
informed deliberation and care precede deaccession decisions. Instead, the 
merits of deaccession’s artistic and financial choices are better left to more 
knowledgeable critics, the museum profession and the public it serves.
The law is not a panacea for all discontent. The art-law scholar Marie Malaro 
once observed that “[t]he law is not designed to make us honorable – only 
bearable . . . .”227 The trust standard would makes deaccessions bearable by 
ensuring additional care in the process; but only non-legal forces such as 
professional ethics and the court of public opinion can secure honour and 
integrity in art deaccessions.   
227 Malaro, �Deaccessioning’,  above, note 11, at p. 273.
